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!Abstract  
!
!
Lobbying in the European Union (EU) is a highly discussed and disputed phenomena. 
The main focus on lobbying in the EU is concerned with how and why lobbyists interact with 
institutional actors, rather than exploring both sides of  the occurrence. The aim of  this thesis 
is to explore and compare whether the European Commission and the European Parliament 
have different demands for lobbying input. The institutional demands is explored through a 
structured focused comparison, which is built on six interviews including two Swedish 
Members of  the European Parliament (MEP), one assistant to a Swedish MEP, two employees 
from the Trade Cabinet in the European Commission, one employee from the  Transparency 
Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and textual material including two 
speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a seminar regarding MEPs views on 
lobbying in Brussels. This thesis applies parts of  the theoretical framework ”Theory of  
access” as the dependent variable, were the established type of  institutional demands are 
incorporated. In order to explain the dependent variable, this thesis have added the 
independent variable of  Interdependence. Moreover, it compares the Commission’s and the 
Parliament’s demands for lobbying input as well as its interdependence to lobbyism 
respectively. It further conclude that as the Commission and the Parliament is devoted to 
different constituencies and have different objectives over political considerations, it affects 
both their type and scope of  demands for lobbying input. 
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!1 Introduction 
!
!
Lobbying has been present in Brussels since the emergence of  the European Union 
(EU). Networking and interest representation  in the EU are decisive for the private sector 1
and civil society all across Europe when it comes to acquiring information and representing 
interests. Lobbying is an equally important factor for the EU institutions as it contributes to 
effective political communication (Hague & Harrop 2010: 239). The increasingly 
comprehensive lobbying that we are witnessing today took off  in the 1980-90s. It is claimed 
that there is a clear link between the increasingly intense lobbying activities which blossomed 
considerably during the 90’s and the increasingly centralized regulatory function that shifted 
from member states to the EU institutions’ (Tallberg et al. 2011: 25; Coen 2007: 3). Another 
reason that is often cited in the literature regarding the increased lobbying in the EU, is the 
introduction of  qualified majority voting on the single market issues (Naurin 2001: 14, 49, 81; 
Coen 2007: 3). As the EU institutions’ competences increased, it created the need for an 
information flow from the private sector’s insights into current policy areas affecting the 
industry. The EU institutions’ enhanced need for input contributed to an openness of  the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, which meant that lobbyists had the 
opportunity to affect and influence each stage of  the policy process (Coen 2007: 3). During 
this time, the lobbyist input to the EU's institutions has been described as a major 
contributing factor of  relevant and necessary information for the development of  EU public 
policy source of  legitimacy to policy-makers (Coen 2007: 3). Lobbying is well established in 
western politics and both politicians as well as political scientists recognize the benefits and 
legitimate roles of  public and private stakeholders interacting in the policy process 
(Greenwood & Thomas 1998: 487-488; Coen 2007: 3). Due to the increasing amount of  
lobbyists in Brussels, the European Commission and the European Parliament have jointly 
introduced a European Transparency Initiative  and Codes of  Conduct in order to manage 2
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 This thesis uses the terms lobbying and interest representation interchangeably.1
 The European Commission and the European Parliament have merged in a joint European Transparency 2
Register in 2011 on the basis of  an Inter-Institutional Agreement. The Transparency Register is a voluntary 
system where any interest representation seeking to directly or indirectly influence the EU decision-making 
process should register (Mańko et al. 2014).
!
the lobbyists’ access (Coen 2007: 4). However, it is argued that these attempts to regulate 
lobbyists’ access to the institutions, have resulted in a competitive elite pluralist surrounding, 
meaning that access to decision-makers is restrictive and more competitive (Coen 2007: 4). It 
is commonly acknowledged that the Commission is in need of  policy-relevant information 
and has due to it’s understaffing regular external consultation processes within all sectorial 
policy areas (Richardson 2006: 248-249). According to Article 11 in The Treaty of  the 
European Union (TEU), the Commission is obligated to exchange views with stakeholders 
when drafting proposals for legislation (Zibold 2013: 3). Due to the Commission’s technical 
and regulatory functions, it is in need of  expert- and technical information which lobbyists 
willingly supply (Chalmers 2013: 477). It has been argued that:  
!
The informational nature of  lobbying is particularly important in the EU, since the different decision-
making institutions in the EU actively generate a huge demand for policy relevant information. All of  the 
decision-making bodies in the EU are deeply affected by the conditions of  informational asymmetry and rely on 
lobbyists for a steady supply of  policy-relevant information (Chalmers 2011: 475).  !
It is further identified that the three main EU institutions, i.e., the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of  Ministers, are in need of  
information for the legislative process (Bouwen 2002a: 8). 
!
!
1.1 Research problem & motivation 
!
The driving factor for wanting to conduct a study on lobbying in the EU is that there 
seems to be a difference in the societal perception and the substantial functions of  lobbying in 
relation to the EU institutions. Furthermore, there is much focus on explaining one aspect of  
the matter, mainly why and how lobbyists interact with decision-makers (supply side), rather 
than viewing the phenomena of  lobbying from both sides as a part of  a political system built 
upon information sharing. There is a theoretical gap in asking the questions why and how the 
institutional actors (demand-side) interact with lobbyists. A study that explores what motivates 
the EU institutions to interact with lobbyists (demand side) can contribute to the intelligibility 
of  how the interaction between the actors look.  
!
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The research problem of  this study is motivated by the absence of  information on the 
”receiving side” or ”demand side” of  lobbying. Lobbying is something that occurs on a daily 
basis in communities globally, yet we know very little about how the larger context functions 
as a whole. We know very much about how lobbyists operate, nevertheless very little about 
what the institutional actors’ role in the phenomenon of  lobbying is. Simply stated, lobbying 
comprises at least two parties, namely the one or more that lobby, and one or more that is 
lobbied. The mainstream rendering of  lobbying is portrayed as a single sided occurrence, 
with lobbyists constantly projecting to the other party who eagerly receives what is given. 
However, lobbying can be seen as a phenomenon of  exchange that benefits both parties. So, 
what is the institutional gain of  this relationship and what are the different demands for 
input? The EU is a system whose structure is constructed in a way that requires external input 
in order to maintain functionality. However, both in social science and in society, lobbying is 
regarded as not desirable and related to undemocratic issues. The debate encompassing 
lobbying is continuously revolving around how lobbyists’ are forcing themselves on public 
authorities, exerting influence over politicians, officials and policy proposals, its negative affect 
on public interests and how it is a cause of  issues regarding democratic deficit and the 
legitimacy of  the EU (Naurin 2001: 49, 89; Foeeurope.org 2013: 1; Tallberg et al. 2011: 77). 
The overall image, suggesting that lobbying is a profound problem in our society does not 
correlate with the facts of  the regular contact that occurs between the parties. The dichotomy 
of  arguments surrounding the discourse on lobbying in the EU makes it difficult to foresee 
how the two non-overlapping parts actually are interrelated and functioning in daily practice. 
The importance of  information is a recognized factor to why lobbyists’ and the EU 
institutions interact. As mentioned above, the Commission is obliged to interact with 
stakeholders when initiating legislation in order to be well informed and to prevent 
undesirable outcomes. The choice of  comparing the European Commission’s and the 
European Parliament’s needs and demands for lobby input with excluding the Council of  
Ministers is based on the consideration that the Commission and the Parliament have agreed 
upon a joint Transparency register. Therefore, their basis for interacting with lobbyists’ is 
harmonized and established on a joint structure based on equal starting points.  
!
!
!
!
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1.2 Research question & aim 
!
Accordingly, the research questions are as follows: 
With these research questions as a guideline, the aim of  this thesis is to explore and 
compare whether the Commission and the Parliament have different needs and demands for 
lobbying input. It will do so through a structured focused comparison, which is built on six 
interviews including two Swedish Members of  the European Parliament (MEP), one assistant 
to a Swedish MEP, two employees from the Trade Cabinet of  the European Commission, one 
employee from the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and 
textual material including two speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a 
seminar regarding MEPs views on lobbying in Brussels. With the mentioned sources as a 
basis, this thesis will examine and compare whether the Commission’s and the Parliament’s 
demands for lobbyist input differ.  
!
!
1.3 Contributions 
!
This study aims to contribute with findings to help fill the theoretical gap of  knowledge 
regarding the demand-side of  lobbying in the EU. From a scientific perspective, the study can 
be motivated by arguing that the majority of  previous research focuses on the supply side of  
lobbying (among many see, Chalmers 2011, 2013; Balosin 2009; Eising 2007; Klüver 2012). 
It often portrays lobbying as having a negative impact on democracy and as an infiltrator in 
the corridors of  power that possesses excessive influence. Since the discourse revolving around 
lobbying is mainly supply side focused and concerned with how they influence the democratic 
system, there are clear motives to conduct a study that focuses on what and why the 
Commission and the Parliament types of  demand. From an empirical perspective, it is of  
value to conduct a study that highlights the institutional demands for lobbying in order to 
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What are the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s different 
demands for lobbying input? How can it be discerned, and Why does it differ?
!
increase the overall picture of  lobbyism role in the multi-level system of  governance that the 
EU encompasses. The thesis’ aims to contribute with information and knowledge regarding 
why and how institutional actors from the Commission and the Parliament need and desire to 
interact with lobbyists.  
!
!
1.4 Lobbying definition  
!
The meaning of  the concept lobbying is highly disputed. The comprehensive 
uncertainty on what the term lobbying actually means is evident for those who desire to study 
the field is acquainted by. Due to the high uncertainty of  what this term means, includes and 
actually stands for, this section will present a few ideas around the concept to demonstrate the 
most common definitions of  the term, but also to highlight how the variation can be depicted. 
!
The political scientists Baumgartner and Leech made a literature review on lobbying 
and stated that the “word ’lobbying’ has seldom been used the same way twice by those 
studying the topic” (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 33). Chalmers identifies eleven different 
types of  interest group representation in the EU, which are; professional associations, 
companies, law firms, public affairs consultancies, chambers of  commerce, academic 
organizations, trade unions, Non-Governmental Organization’s (NGO) and associations of  
NGO’s, representatives of  religions, churches and communities of  conviction, think-thanks 
and public authorities like regions cities and municipalities (Chalmers 2011: 473). Chalmers 
defines interests groups as ”any group that seeks to influence the policy-making process but 
does not seek to be elected” (Chalmers 2011: 476). Balosin defines a lobbyists as ”persons that 
are neither government officials nor politicians within the European Parliament or 
Commission, who try to influence the decision-making processes in the EU” (Balosin 2009: 
1181). She argues for a broad definition that is not excluding those who are not working as 
professional lobbyists but who are nevertheless active lobbyists, i.e., members of  think-thanks 
etc (Balosin 2009: 1181). The term ’Professional lobbyists’ is referring to those who are 
working full-time for clients, i.e., consultants and lawyers.  
!
In a library briefing of  the European Parliament, it is stated that the Council of  Europe 
recognizes lobbying as ”a concerted effort to influence policy formulation and decision-
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making with a view to obtaining some designated result from government authorities and 
elected representatives” (Zibold 2013: 1). This could be interpreted in a wider sense as well as 
in a more restrictive sense. In a wider sense, this definition on the term ”lobbying” could refer 
to public actions such as demonstrations as well as public affairs activities carried out by 
consultancies, think-thanks, advocacy groups, lawyers etc (Zibold 2013: 1). However, in a 
more restrictive way, the term ”lobbying” is then referring to the protection of  the corporate 
lobbying’s economic interests based on a national or global arena (Zibold 2013: 1). The 
Parliament is communicating a concern regarding the fact that a precise definition of  
lobbying is non-existing (Zibold 2013: 1). Due to the variating range of  very narrow to very 
wide understandings of  what lobbying professions include, there is a lack of  consensus 
regarding what the term ”lobbying” in fact means (OECD 2012: 22; Zibold 2013: 1). This 
thesis will utilize all the above-mentioned definitions as the basis for this thesis understanding 
on the concept of  lobbying. This choice was made in order to avoid the risk of  excluding, but 
rather in order to broadly include. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!2 Previous Research & Theory 
!
!
2.1 Previous Research 
!
Lobbying is often associated with both corruption as well as being a recognized supplier 
of  information. The most frequent research problem in previous research focuses on 
answering questions similar to: ’How much influence do interest groups have over politics in 
the EU?’, ’Are some interest groups more influential than others?’, or ’What resources and 
strategic approaches provide the best conditions for influence in the EU?’. These perspectives 
has the aim to explain the functions and activities of  lobbying and the process of  influencing 
decision-makers. This implies that the main focus is on how lobbyists are working, developing 
strategies and collecting as well as projecting information in order to be able to participate in 
the policy process and influence decision-makers in various policy areas. Research on what 
the demand side of  the interaction between lobbyists and policy-makers comprises, is much 
less explored. A strong focus on what lobbyists supply role in the political system resembles is 
interesting and important to enhance our understanding of  how the dynamic between 
interest representation and public sector looks and operates in our society. The section on 
previous research will therefore be organized by three different research approaches, namely 
the general negative outlook on lobbying, the dominating supply side research and finally the 
positive supply side outlook on lobbying.  
!
Previous research that perceives lobbying as a problem related to democratic matters 
have raised perspectives such as the Weberian notion of  power: ”The opportunity to impose 
one’s will in a social relationship, even against resistance, without consideration to what 
opportunity rests on” (Chalmers 2011: 474). Robert Dahl’s interpretation has a pluralistic 
view on power and clarifies Weber’s notion of  power further: ”A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 203). 
There is also the perception of  influence as the power over outcomes, meaning that lobbying 
is exerting power when the policy outcome is close to their ideal points (Dür & Bièvre 2007: 
3). Previous research in line with these perspectives also suggest that various lobbying interests 
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are not evenly represented (Tallberg et al. 2011: 25; Klüver 2012: 494; Chalmers 2011: 473; 
Eising 2007: 390; Naurin 2001: 88). Previous research on lobbying in the EU has described 
the EU system as both a pluralistic and corporatist (Tallberg et al. 2011: 27). The EU as a 
pluralistic system is characterized by an openness in the political institutions, where there is a 
wide range of  lobbying interests which compete to be able to represent the same kind of  
interests (Tallberg et al. 2011: 26-27). The EU as a corporatist system is in contrast to a 
pluralistic system, only selectively open to a hand full of  interests which alone represent their 
interests (Tallberg et al. 2011: 26-27). Several approaches to lobbying tend to raise the elite 
pluralism argument regarding lobbying in the EU, which implies that certain lobbying 
interests have privileged access to the policy-making process whereas others are systematically 
excluded (Chalmers 2011: 473; Tallberg et al. 2011: 25).  
!
The theoretical use of  the elite pluralism approach as an explanation on how lobbying 
in the EU is functioning, often highlights the perspective of  lobbyists participation in the EU 
policy making as restricted to a limited number of  policy actors, which makes the process of  
whom to include very competitive (Naurin 2001: 29; Coen 1997). This approach is nourished 
by arguments stating that it is due to the EU’s multi-level system with strong elements of  
power-sharing between the institutions, which have contributed to its pluralistic characteristics 
(Tallberg et al. 2011: 91-92). Others have highlighted the institutionalized relationships 
between certain lobbyists and the EU institutions, such as the EU social dialogue, and 
therefore stresses the EU system to be more corporatist (Falkner 1998: 187-188). 
Categorizations of  lobbyists as framers, argue that the majority of  the lobbyists’ time is spent 
on convincing stakeholders that a certain issue should be seen in a separate matter 
(Baumgartner 2007: 485). This implies that lobbyists’ attempt to diffuse the various possible 
dimensions of  directions that public authorities could take due to their own interests, in order 
for the procedure of  policy to be in line with their aim (Baumgartner 2007: 485, 486). There 
are arguments stating that the lobbying profession and the actual word ”lobbying” has a 
negative connotation due to the mass-media’s great myths of  lobbying which reads as follows; 
”The legislator is dominated by the lobbyist, money is the key of  lobbying, industry destroys 
NGOs, corruption increases because of  lobbyism” (Balosin 2009: 1181).  
!
This perspective focuses on characterizing and improving the understanding of  how 
lobbyists are working towards political objectives and what the underlying intentions for 
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contact politicians are. There is moreover a strong focus of  emphasizing under which 
conditions that lobbyists have more or less influence in the policy process (Naurin 2001: 
90-92). Broadly speaking, it is concerned with increasing the understanding of  how lobbyists 
operate in the light of  influencing public policies, how it can be depicted from various supply-
side perspectives and what the purpose of  lobbying is. It is concerned with how lobbyists 
assemble and process information, but also how they pursue the actual representation of  
interests (Chalmers 2011). These are usually based on case studies and conducted in a very 
detailed manner. It is argued that the currency of  lobbying in the EU is information 
(Chalmers 2011: 471, 475; Chalmers 2013). Information as a form of  currency shapes 
lobbyists organizational culture, their behavior and their daily work, since any adjustment to 
the needs of  policymakers can benefit them in the final stage of  the process, i.e., information 
sets the tone of  how lobbyists interact with EU decision-makers (Chalmers 2013: 39). While 
decision-makers receive vital information needed for policy-making, the lobbyists’ returned 
favor is a legitimate access to the EU's institutions and the policy making process with the 
chance of  being listened to (Chalmers 2013: 39). The lobbyists supply decision-makers with 
needed information in return for legitimate access to the policy making process. Access can be 
seen as a function of  the informational needs of  decision-makers (Chalmers 2013: 40). This 
further means that lobbyists that share information with those decision-makers who value it 
the most, can also gain more influence through increased access. Balosin argues that the 
success of  EU lobbying is due to the EU being a consensus oriented governance that strives 
for a coherent long-term policy development (Balosin 2009: 1180). She further argues that 
there is a weakness of  the EU’s institutional system as a multi-level governance and to its 
existing political parties, which makes the access of  private interest uncomplicated and 
effective to take part in and influence the policy process (Balosin 2009: 1180). This implies 
that lobbying interests possess a significant and unique role in the policy-making process, since 
the EU is increasingly in need of  information on complex issues requiring expertise 
knowledge, which lobbyists can provide (Balosin 2009: 1180). Due to the easy access, lobbyists 
can highlight their interests while providing the EU decision-makers with desired technical 
information, meaning that the relationship is based on a win-win deal, since the lobbyists get 
to raise their interests and the EU institutions receives the information needed without having 
to work for it (Balosin 2009: 1180).  
!
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Positive supply side views on lobbying argue that lobbying is concerned with the 
exchange of  information between lobbyists and understaffed decision-makers (Chalmers 
2011: 474), and that the EU decision-makers and officials would not function without 
lobbyists, since it would be hard for the institutions to conduct public business without 
lobbyists (OECD 2012: 27). Lobbyists represent interests and can be viewed as an important 
function in a democratic governance, since it provides the EU decision-makers with policy-
relevant information and expertise on any given matter, which secures procedures and 
processes for further development (OECD 2012: 27). Bouwen argues that the degree to which 
some lobbyists can participate in the policy process and the degree to which they have gained 
access to the institutions is dependent on their ability to provide the decision-makers with 
policy relevant information (Bouwen 2004: 341). Lobbyists fulfill a function that usually goes 
unnoticed. While lobbyists supply decision-makers with scientific data or public opinions, they 
are also informing their employers or clients regarding the actions of  governmental 
authorities, which is consequential in regard to holding decision-makers accountable and 
oblige to effectuate compliance with the law (OECD 2012: 27). 
!
!
2.2 Theoretical framework 
!
The research field of  lobbying in the EU has been and can be theorized through a 
variation of  perspectives and theories, depending on which approach and level of  analysis 
one wishes to achieve. The diversity of  theoretical approaches highlight various actors' role, 
function and the interaction in progress between the actors involved. Furthermore, the choice 
of  theory is decisive for what the study concentrates on, and what is regarded as important to 
convey in the study. There are a number of  well-developed theories and perspectives that will 
not be addressed in this thesis as these will not act as a means to highlight the desired, i.e., 
what the Commission and the Parliaments demands for lobbying input are. The theoretical 
framework of  this thesis which will assist to further explore and explain the Commission’s and 
the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input is the ”Theory of  access”. Parts of  this 
theoretical framework will function as the dependent variable. It will be explained through the 
independent variable which the author of  this thesis has added in order to build on the theory 
of  access. The independent variable is the degree of  interdependence. This will further be 
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analyzed through interviews and textual material, in order to compare the units of  analysis, 
i.e., the Commission and the Parliament. 
!
!
2.3 Dependent variable - Bouwen’s Access Goods 
  
This thesis has its starting point in examining the dependent variable, which is different 
types of  institutional demands for lobbying input. The focus of  this thesis is therefore on the 
various institutional demands for lobbying input and will thus not be problematize further 
into how these demands for input are fulfilled, since that is beyond the scope of  this thesis. 
The theoretical framework of  ”Theory of  Access” has determined and identified three types 
of  access goods, i.e., institutional demands that vary between the Commission and the 
Parliament. These institutional demands will be incorporated as this thesis dependent variable 
and will function as the base of  established institutional demands. They will be measured, but 
also further explained, since the identified demands are linked to the specific case of  the 
legislative process in the EU.  
!
!
2.3.1 The Theory of  Access 
!
Pieter Bouwen has extended the range of  exchange theories with his addition of  
”Theory of  access”. The theory of  access, also called the logic of  access, is developed in order 
to explain and increase the understanding of  the interaction and exchange that occur 
between lobbying actors and the actors within the three main EU institutions, i.e., the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of  Ministers (Bouwen 
2002, 2004). It provides a theoretical framework to measure the degree of  access that 
lobbying representation has to the EU institutions in terms of  a theory of  the supply and 
demand of  access goods (Bouwen 2004: 340). Access goods is referring to information that is 
vital in the EU policy-making process (Bouwen 2004: 337). According to this theory, lobbyists 
are obliged to supply the EU institutions with certain goods in return for legitimate access to 
the EU agenda setting and policy-making process (Bouwen 2004: 337). For lobbyists to gain 
access to the policy-making process, it has to provide the ”access goods” (information) 
demanded by the institution in which they want to play a part (Bouwen 2002: 369). Bouwen’s 
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theoretical framework is developed and conducted in order to answer the question; ”What 
determines the degree of  access of  lobbyists to the European institutions?” (Bouwen 2002a). 
Bouwen argues that these access goods are a vital part of  understanding the exchange relation 
between lobbyists and the EU institutions (Bouwen 2002a: 9). Bouwen is concerned with 
different organizational forms of  lobbying in regard to their degree of  access to the three 
main EU institutions. Bouwen’s research has much focus on the supply side of  lobbying which 
is not of  interest in this thesis. However, he address and has determined three institutional 
demands for lobbying input. The theoretical framework has identified variables of  
institutional demands which lobbyists supply, in order to further understand the interaction 
between lobbying and public actors. This thesis does not intend to include Bouwen’s supply 
variable explaining the lobbyist degree of  access, since the aim is to further explain as well as 
compare the Commission and the Parliament institutional demands. However, Bouwen’s 
results regarding the institutional demands will be incorporated in this thesis dependent 
variable in order to further explore what the Commission and the Parliament demands for 
lobbying input are, as well as explain why they differ. Bouwen’s research and theoretical 
framework is concerned with EU legislative lobbying (2002a), which implies that the 
determined factors of  institutional demands are set in relation to the legislative process. Three 
access goods are identified, and concern three different kinds of  information that the EU 
institutions  demand from lobbying stakeholders in relation to the legislative process. 3
Bouwen’s identified access goods which in this thesis will be used as the basis for this thesis 
dependent variable, i.e., type of  demands are as follows:  
!
Expert Knowledge (EK) 
This access good concerns the expertise and technical know-how needed from lobbyists 
in order to understand the potential policy outcomes. This kind of  information is important 
for the development of  effective EU legislation in a various policy areas (Bouwen, 2002a: 8). 
According to Bouwen, this kind of  information is mainly demanded by the Commission, due 
to its supranational status and its central position in the EU legislative process as well as its 
understaffing, it is in great need of  expertise knowledge (Bouwen 2002a: 14-15).  
!
!
"  OF "17 70
 The demands of  the Council of  Ministers is excluded, since it is not an object of  research that will be 3
examined in this thesis.  
!
Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)  
This access good concerns the information needed from lobbyists about the European 
encompassing interest. The European encompassing interests concerns the interests of  
various sectors in the European economic arena, i.e., the internal market (Bouwen 2002a: 8). 
According to Bouwen, this type of  information is also important for the Commission, in order 
to push Member States to accept policies beyond intergovernmental and to be able to act as a 
promoter of  European interests, it needs to know what the common European interests are 
(Bouwen 2002a: 14-15). Bouwen further argues that this type of  information is also important 
for the Parliament, since it has to evaluate the Commission’s legislative proposals from a 
European perspective (Bouwen 2002a: 14). This type of  input provides the Parliament with 
information about the interests of  European stakeholders (Bouwen 2002a: 14).  
!
Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)  
This access good is the information about the domestic encompassing interest needed 
from lobbyists. The domestic encompassing interests can be defined as the needs and interests 
of  various sectors in the domestic market (Bouwen 2002a: 8). According to Bouwen, this 
information is vital for MEPs since they are elected at national level and need to know the 
preferences of  their voters in order to increase their chances for re-election (Bouwen 2002a: 
14).  
!
These three institutional demands will function as operationalizations of  the dependent 
variable, meaning that these factors will act as the basis for comparing the Commission’s and 
the Parliament’s various demands for lobbying input. This thesis will use Bouwen’s 
determined factors of  institutional demands as a basis for measuring whether there are other 
institutional demands which have not been addressed. Since Bouwen’s discoveries on various 
institutional demands are directly linked to the legislative process, there is given space to 
further investigate whether there are other demands which are not the same as those linked to 
the legislative process. 
!
!
!
!
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2.4 Independent variable - Interdependence 
!
In order to build on Bouwen’s theory this thesis will add another variable, the 
independent variable of  interdependence. Since Bouwen’s theory of  access mainly focuses on 
the supply side of  lobbying, this thesis will build on Bouwen’s theory in order to explain the 
dependent variable. The assumption is that different factors of  interdependence can 
demonstrate higher or lower demands for lobbying input and therefore answer the research 
questions of  how the demands can be discerned, and why it differs. In order to answer these 
research questions, the independent variable will include three indicators of  interdependency 
which the author of  this thesis has determined to be; mutual exchange, resource dependence 
and organizational structure. Bouwen has determined that there are institutional demands as 
well as a variation within these, however the author of  this thesis desire to find out why this is 
the case and whether there are other institutional demands which has not been addressed. 
Bouwen’s identified differences have created incentives for further examining why the scope 
of  institutional demands for lobbying input differs. The dependent variables of  institutional 
demands as well as the scope of  demands will be explained by the degree of  interdependency, 
which intends to help explain why there is a difference of  demands between the Commission 
and the Parliament as well as why there is a difference in high or low degrees of  demands. 
The degree of  interdependence, will be able to say more about how the use of  lobbyism can 
look different. It is intended to demonstrate that in cases where the various indicators of  
interdependence are met, it will have an impact on how much demands are requested and to 
what extent they are necessary. This will be further examined by testing a hypothesis which 
the author of  this thesis have developed in order to link the independent and dependent 
variable; The higher the degree of  interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-
makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. 
!
The three indicators for interdependence that will function as the operationalization in 
order to indicate a higher or lower degree of  interdependence during interview sessions 
includes the following. 
!
Mutual exchange 
This indicator means that the interacting actors exchange services, information or other 
things on a frequent basis. This will be measured by asking the interviewees of  the frequency 
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that they meet with lobbyists through both informal and formal forums in order to exchange 
goods which one actor has and the other one needs. When there is a frequent contact 
characterized by exchanging goods, it is argued that the relationship is a mutual exchange. 
Frequent contact requires three times a week. The regular contact can facilitate the demand 
of  input easier as the availability increases. This indicator will be measured by examining and 
ask how often the interviewees meet with lobbyists, in what form they meet, i.e., informal/
formal and whether the purpose of  frequent meetings are to exchange goods. 
!
Resource dependence 
This indicator implies that institutional actors are dependent on the resources which 
lobbyists possesses. This may for example mean that institutional actors need lobbyists 
resources in order to have enough basis to be able to legislate, to have the necessary 
information regarding current issues, in order to improve the business within the European 
internal market and the access to markets outside the EU, etc. Resource dependency is 
assumed to imply that the scope of  demands increases. This indicator will be measured by 
asking how often goods are demanded and how important these are in relation to how it 
affects their ability to carry out the work as well as how vital the requested resources are for 
the functioning of  their work duties. 
!
Organizational Structure 
The author of  this thesis argues that organizational structure can function as an 
indicator of  interdependence. By examining whether the institutional actors’ working 
structure is constructed in a way that makes them dependent on lobbying input, one can see 
whether this affect higher or lower degrees on type of  demands. It may for example be that as 
the EU's areas of  competence increase, the need to be informed increases to a greater extent, 
which leads to more type of  demands. This can also be linked to the fact that the Commission 
is a relatively small and understaffed institution in relation to what its expected to perform 
and is therefore in need of  input. It could also be linked to MEPs membership in various 
parliamentarian committees, which might affect their scope of  demanded input. 
Organizational structure as an indicator of  interdependence will be measured by asking 
interviewees to explain why the lobbying input is demanded in relation to their work tasks. 
!
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It is argued that in order to understand the activities of  lobbying in the EU, one has to 
discern the relationship between lobbyists and decision-makers as an exchange relation 
between two interdependent actors (Bouwen 2002a: 7). Bouwen highlights the EU institutions 
enthusiasm to interact with lobbyist as a response of  needing to have close contact in order to 
fulfill their institutional work (ibid). The exchange theories developed by sociologists in the 
60s, argued that the interaction between private and public actors could be understood as a 
sequence of  inter-organizational exchanges (ibid). The understanding of  lobbyists and public 
actors interaction as a mutual exchange is also found in resource dependency theories. These 
approaches stress the importance of  an understanding that organizations need to exchange 
resources (ibid). Resource dependency focuses on the interdependency between the 
interacting organizations and suggests that organizations cannot be self-reliant since they 
require resources from their surroundings and therefore need to interact with those who 
possesses the resources that are needed (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 258). Pfeffer and Salancik 
argue that ”interdependence is important to an organization because of  the impact it has on 
the ability of  the organization to achieve its desired outcomes” (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 41). 
Furthermore, it is argued that the decisive importance of  a resource needed by an 
organization, lies in the comprehensiveness to which the organization requires the specific 
resource to be able to fulfill its duties (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 46–47). In relation to the EU 
policy process, lobbyists and decision-makers become interdependent for the reason that they 
need resources from each other in order to function (Bouwen 2002a: 7). The activities of  
organizations such as the EU will always involve exchanges with other actors. It might involve 
monetary or physical resources, information or social legitimacy. Since organizations are not 
independent or self-sufficient, they depend on the external actors to provide relevant 
resources and support (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43). 
!
This thesis argues that the degree and types of  demands, can be explained and 
discerned by the level of  interdependency between the lobbyists and the Commission and 
Parliament respectively. The form of  exchange between lobbyists and the Commission and 
the Parliament can determine the degree of  how much demands there is. It is assumed that 
the higher the degree of  interdependence, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. 
The degree of  interdependence can also help to explain the type of  demands by explaining 
how the use of  lobbying can look differently. The level of  interdependency will be measured 
through conducting interviews with two MEPs, one assistant to a Swedish MEP, as well as 
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three employees from the Commission, where the answers will act as empirics of  institutional 
demands and their interdependence to lobbying stakeholders. Bouwen’s variables of  EK, 
IEEI and IDEI  will act as determined types of  demands of  the Commission and the 4
Parliament. The conducted interviews and textual material will function as the empirics to the 
dependent variable, ”Type of  Demands” which will be categorized by the Commission and 
the Parliament respectively, as well as the interviewees degree of  interdependence and how 
this affect their demands which also will be categorized by the Commission and the 
Parliament respectively.  
 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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 EK - Expert Knowledge 4
IEEI - Information on the European Encompassing Interest 
IDEI - Information on the Domestic Encompassing Interest
Dependent Variable 
Type of  Demands 
- EK 
- IEEI 
- IDEI
Independent Variable 
Degree of  Interdependence 
- Mutual exchange 
- Resource dependence 
- Organizational structure 
!3 Measuring The Demands For 
Lobbying Input 
!
!
3.1 Research Design 
!
Up until now, this thesis has presented its aim and motivation, the previous research 
within the field as well as the theoretical framework of  this thesis. This chapter will focus on 
the methodology of  this thesis as well as the build up for the coming analysis of  empirics. As 
this thesis main objective is to further explain and compare whether the Commission and the 
Parliament demands for lobbying input varies in different aspects, the analysis will be 
characterized by comparative method. The main feature of  this thesis is that it is based on 
qualitative aspects which is suitable since the purpose of  the study is to compare, depict and 
describe the essential of  a particular social phenomenon and how it is constituted in depth. 
The qualitative characteristics will be the basis for how this study regard and focuses on open 
versatile empiricism. The research process is inductive, meaning that it is the observations and 
the collected material which will form the basis for being able to present explanations and 
reasoning about the research aim (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 115-116). Qualitative method will be 
used for the purpose to describe, explain and interpret the research problem, which further 
will be compared and analyzed. In qualitative studies it is assumed that reality can be 
perceived in many different ways which implies that there is no absolute and objective truth 
(Esaiasson et al. 2012: 19-20). The qualitative method is also used in exploratory research, i.e., 
when you know very little in advance of  the phenomenon or issue, which is in line with this 
thesis starting point and research objective (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 193). The purpose of  this 
qualitative study is to get as broad and accurate a description as possible of  the Commission’s 
and the Parliament’s needs and demands of  lobbying input.  
!
!
!
!
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3.2 Method, data collection & type of  analysis 
!
In order to detect the Commission’s and the Parliament’s various kinds of  institutional 
demands for lobbying input, this thesis method will be a structured focused comparison, 
which is built on six interviews including two Swedish MEPs, one assistant to a Swedish MEP, 
two employees from the Trade Cabinet of  the Commission, one employee from the 
Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and textual material 
including two speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a seminar regarding 
MEPs views on lobbying in Brussels. The thesis units’ of  analysis is the Commission and the 
Parliament. These units will be examined in order to operationalize the variables. The 
Commission and the Parliament will be the objectives under examination in order to identify 
the linkage between the dependent and the independent variable. The units of  analysis is the 
study objectives that will help discover empirical findings which will cover insights from both 
the dependent and the independent variable.  
!
An interview requests was sent out to a total of  thirty persons, including 10 Swedish 
MEPs, one former assistant to a former swedish MEP which the author of  this thesis was 
referred to, seven Commissioners and twelve members of  two Commissioners teams. The 
selection of  MEPs is based on a recommendation given through a conversation the author 
had with Europe Direct, who urged her to contact Swedish MEPs because they are generally 
susceptible to set up interviews. The selection from the Commission is based on the fields 
which in they work. By reading much on lobbying in general and on specific case studies, it is 
noticeable that certain fields such as, environment, agriculture, trade and energy is more likely 
to accommodate with lobbying interests since their course of  action affects lobbying 
stakeholders vastly. It is thus more likely to have greater opportunity to depict different 
demands for input within these areas. Therefore the Commissioners within the areas of  trade, 
energy, climate action and energy, agriculture and rural development and health and food 
safety were asked to participate in interviews. The twelve officials from the two 
Commissioners teams were selected on the basis of  availability. Many Commissioners team 
information does not refer to any further contact information, but rather to one email address 
or to one phone number, which is covering the whole Cabinet. The twelve selected team 
members which had available contact information are working within the teams for Trade 
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Commissioner Mrs Cecilia Malmström (Sweden) and Agriculture and rural development 
Commissioner Mr Phil Hogan (United Kingdom). 
!
The selected interviewees were kindly asked to choose to participate through either a 
telephone interview, Skype interview or to answer and submit the interview questions via 
email. The interview consists of  thirteen questions. There are pros and cons of  using different 
types of  interview methods. The advantage of  carrying out the interviews through telephone 
or Skype is that it function as a conversation, which allows the opportunity to address further 
questions, issues etc. The cons of  carrying out interviews through email lies in the fact that 
misunderstandings of  concepts or questions may occur easily than in conversational 
interviews. The different types of  interview options were included in hope of  raising the 
participation rate and in order for the interviewees to be able to choose the interview option 
which suited them the best. The response rate of  the requested interviews have been 
perceived as somewhat low as only six out of  thirty persons participated. 
!
The Interviewees 
The interviewees consist of  three employees from the Commission, two Swedish MEPs 
and one assistant to a Swedish MEP. The first interview from the Commission was conducted 
with Mrs Jolana Mungengová that operates as policy assistant to Trade Commissioner Mrs 
Cecilia Malmström. The second interview from the Commission was conducted with Mr 
Miguel Ceballos Barón which operates as Deputy Head of  Cabinet under Trade 
Commissioner Mrs Cecilia Malmström’s office. The third interview from the Commission 
was conducted with Mr Martin Ohridski who is a Policy Officer at the Transparency Unit at 
the Secretariat General in the European Commission. Mr Ohridski works with the 
management of  the joint Transparency register which is managed together with colleges from 
the European Parliament and with wider transparency issues related to the Commission. All 
the interviewees from the Commission were conducted via telephone. Mr Lars Adaktusson is 
a Swedish Christian Democrat in the parliamentarian group of  European Peoples’ Party. The 
interview with Mr Adaktusson was conducted by email, which turned out to provide 
somewhat shorter, but direct and clear answers to the questions asked. Mrs Malin Björk is a 
Swedish politician in the Left party and a Member in the parliamentarian Confederal Group 
of  the European United Left - Nordic Green Left. This interview was also conducted through 
email. However, unlike the email interview with Mr Adaktusson, this interview provided 
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longer and more detailed answers to the questions asked. The third interview from the 
Parliament was conducted by email with Mrs Dalia Lahdo who works as an accredited 
parliamentary assistant to Mrs Bodil Ceballos who is a Swedish politician in the Green party 
and a Member of  the Parliamentarian Group of  the Greens/European Free Alliance. 
!
The selection of  interviewees and its various positions within the Commission and the 
Parliament are assumed to detect different types of  demands for lobbying input. As the 
Commission and the Parliament functions differ, it is possible that their type of  demands for 
input also differ. The Commission is devoted to represent the general European interest and 
are divided into specific policy departments, which possibly means that the interviewees from 
the Commission has specific needs depending on which Cabinet or DG they are positioned 
in. The Parliament, on the other hand, is intended to represent the people, i.e., the civil 
society in the EU. However, as they are elected at national level, they have an obligation to 
pursue the issues that exist with their national political party which citizens voted as 
important. This means that MEPs are active and engaged in parliamentary committees that 
drive development in areas that pleases their own and the national party's agendas. This 
means that the interviewed from the Parliament may have different demands for lobbying 
input depending on which party they represent and what committees they are members of. 
The answers to this thesis research questions will naturally be affected by the fact that the 
interviewed from the Parliament are either Swedish politician or representative of  a Swedish 
politician, and that two of  the interviewees from the Commission are colleagues within the 
trade cabinet and that the third interviewee from the Commission is working within the 
Transparency Unit. A wider variety of  MEPs from different countries, as well as a wider 
selection of  employees from the Commission’s various departments would have contributed 
with a larger scope of  empirical data on institutional demands for lobbying input. 
!
As the six interviews were conducted using different methods, there is a discrepancy of  
whether the interviewees had the opportunity to develop their responses. As the interviewees 
who participated through a telephone interview had the opportunity to question the meaning 
of  certain enquiries or to develop the questions further through discussion, there were not any 
obstacles in the implementation of  this method. However, those who participated in an 
interview by answering the questions in writing through email, did not to the same extent, 
have the opportunity to get further clarity of  the questions asked, which presupposes that the 
"  OF "26 70
!
questions are clear and easy to understand. Examples of  uncertainties regarding the clarity of  
the questions stems from peoples’ perception and interpretation of  concepts, such as: lobbyist, 
institutional demands and interdependency in various ways. The notion of  demands, can 
certainly be interpreted in different ways. Within academia one could for example, associate 
this in relation to theory-based relations of  supply and demand as opposed to those who are 
active in the EU institutions, which could possibly link this to presuming on others assets. In 
order to overcome the possibility of  misunderstandings, a definition of  lobbying and 
institutional demands was provided in the questionnaire. The aforementioned difficulties with 
email interviews were not an issue during the conducted email interviews.  
!
Textual Material for Analysis 
The text material that will be analyzed combined with the three interviews from the 
Commission, are two speeches held by Energy Commissioner Mr Maroš Šefčovič. Due to 
Commissioner Mr Šefčovič former position as responsible of  Inter-institutional Relations and 
Administration, he frequently held speeches and made statements regarding the conditions of  
lobbying in the EU. Mr Šefčovič was kindly asked to participate in an interview, but could 
unfortunately not participate due to lack of  time. Therefore, two of  his former speech will be 
included as analytical materials. The two speeches held by Mr Šefčovič were on the topic of  
lobbying in relation to the Commission, and will be analyzed in order to capture arguments 
and reasoning concerning the institutional demands and their interdependence on lobbying 
input in the Commission. The speeches which will be addressed were held in November 2011 
at a Transparency Register Conference organized by the British Chamber of  Commerce, and 
in June 2014 at the General Assembly of  European Centre for Public Affairs  2.0 (EPCA 2.0) 
in Maastricht University, to talk young professionals about lobbying and transparency. The 
text material that will be analyzed combined with the three interviews from the Parliament, is 
a seminar on lobbying which was organized by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs in 
October 2007. The seminar intended to address MEPs considerations of  Brussels lobbyists. 
This seminar was organized in relation to a consideration on lobbying that the Parliament 
had to deliberate over throughout the autumn of  2007 (European Parliament 2007a). These 
textual material was chosen because it address matters which are of  importance in this thesis 
and can assist in further depicting the institutional demands and their differences. The text 
material on the Commission are more open for interpretation, whilst the text material from 
the Parliament is easier to comprehend as it comprises direct statements from MEPs.  
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Content Analysis 
When analyzing collected text materials from the Commission and the Parliament as 
well as the interviews, content analysis will be used. Content analysis will functions as a tool 
when drawing conclusions about the content of  different types of  communication, such as 
speech, press message, internal briefings or interviews (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 210). The 
purpose of  using this method is to discern and interpret how the selected interviewees argue 
and reasoning on their demands and relation to lobbyists. This means that the material will 
be analyzed and interpreted depending on the materials comprehensiveness, in order to gain 
the arguments, reasoning and underlying content of  the texts and interview material. This 
approach has limitations that should be considered in relation to the final results of  the 
analyzed materials. The major limitation lies in the credibility of  the interpretations and 
discernment produced in the analysis. However, it is a method that will be used in order to 
detect relevant elements in the material that form the foundation for this thesis empirics. 
!
Limitations 
Some of  this thesis limitations have been raised under headings concerned. The main 
limitation of  this thesis is the small number of  interviews and due to small response rate only 
six were collected. Due to the open-ended questions in the interviews, they were still able to 
provide a lot of  information about the research question of  this thesis. Furthermore, 
interviews were complimented with textual material of  two speeches and one seminar. The 
limitation makes it difficult to generalize on institutional demands for lobbying input. 
However, the conducted interviews have brought important information about institutional 
needs and demands for lobbying input and is sufficient to be able to draw relevant conclusions 
from the interview responses in this unexplored area. 
!
!
!
!
!
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!4 Empirics & Analysis  
!
!
This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first two parts will analyze and 
compare the collected material in order to answer the questions: 
!
•  What are the European Commission and the European Parliament’s different 	
	 demands for lobbying input?  
•  How can it be discerned?  
•  Why does it differ?  !
In the first section of  this chapter, the analysis will be based on the thesis’ dependent 
variable, i.e., type of  demand. The empirical data on the Commission's and the Parliament's 
various demands and needs for lobbying input, will be presented and analyzed respectively 
and finally compared. The initial part for both the Commission and the Parliament will begin 
with presenting the empirical data on types of  demands connected to the theoretical 
framework. Thereafter, other types of  institutional demands which have not been addressed 
in the theoretical framework but rather through the interviews, as well as other insights that 
have been addressed through the interviews will be presented and analyzed. 
!
The second part of  this chapter will be starting from the independent variable, i.e., the 
degree of  interdependence. The empirical material will function as the basis to be able to 
depict whether there is a link between the degree of  interdependence and higher or lower 
degree of  institutional demands, i.e., answering the research questions of  ”How it can be 
discerned, and why does it differ”. This part will be structured through the three indicators of  
interdependence which is mutual exchange, resource dependence and organizational 
structure. The hypothesis linking the thesis dependent and independent variable together that 
will be tested is:  
The higher the degree of  interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/
officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input.  
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The third and last part of  this chapter will discuss the linkage between the dependent 
variable, i.e., type of  demands and the independent variable, i.e., the degree of  
interdependence through the empirical results.  
!
!
4.1 The type of  demands 
!
The research to further explore the European Commission’s and the European 
Parliament’s demands and needs for lobbyists input, has started from the dependent variable, 
which contain three established institutional demands for lobbying input. The three identified 
types of  demand is Expert Knowledge (EK), Information about the European Encompassing 
Interest (IEEI) and Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI). According 
to the incorporated demands in the dependent variable, there is a difference between the 
Commission and the Parliament. This section will present and analyze this thesis empirical 
material in order to further evolve on what the institutional demands of  the Commission and 
the Parliament are, and why they differ respectively.   
!
!
4.1.1 The European Commission 
!
According to Bouwen’s findings, the three different types of  demands are not equally 
important for the Commission and the Parliament. This have also become apparent through 
the empirical material from the Commission. Therefore, the type of  demand concerning 
Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) will not be addressed in the 
empirical part of  the Commission’s demands for lobbying input since this type of  demand 
regarding domestic issues is not of  relevance for the Commission, as its constituency is the 
European Union as a whole. Therefore, this part will start by addressing the demands for 
expert knowledge, information about the European encompassing interest (IEEI) and finally 
other empirical findings which has not been addressed within the theoretical framework but 
rather through empirical material.   
!
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Expert Knowledge (EK) 
All the interviewees from the Commission stated to have a great need for expert 
knowledge (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). However, while everyone stated that they have a need for 
expert knowledge, there were differences regarding the demands for lobbying input. Two out 
of  three interviewees from the Commission stated that they are in great need of  expert 
knowledge and demand this from lobbying stakeholders who are experts in the fields of  
interest, while one of  the interviewees stated that the greatly needed expertise is not 
demanded from lobbyists but rather received from the Commissions own expert groups and 
other institutional actors.  
!
The two employees from the Commission who stated that there is a great need and a constant 
demand for lobbying input referred to their demands as a necessity in order to fulfill and meet 
their responsibilities as Commission employees. The expertise is greatly needed by the 
Commission employees in order to access the technical know-how from those who daily 
practice within the filed of  interest, but also in order to understand how the Commissions 
policy outcomes potentially affect various stakeholders (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). The 
Commission’s demands for expert knowledge differs widely since the demands for input 
depends on which Department, Cabinet or DG of  the Commission one is positioned in 
(Interview 4, 6: 2015). In other words, the institutional demand for EK is specific for each 
policy field within the Commission, meaning that the Trade Cabinets types demands for 
lobbying input varies vastly from for example the Energy Cabinets types of  demands. Mr 
Ohridski explained that the European Commission, in particular, has always been very open 
to outside input and proactively seeking input to its policy making (Interview 6: 2015). The 
reason for this is according to Mr Ohridski, that the Commission is a relatively small 
institution that does not have all the expertise that is required in-house and in order to 
produce good laws (Interview 6: 2015). Therefore, they need to hear from the experts in the 
various policy fields e.g. internal market, transport, fisheries, environment etc (Interview 6: 
2015). In other words, it is stated that the Commission does not have the technical expertise 
which is required to independently form policies, and that they therefore need lobbying input 
in order to know the impact of  the policy making on the ground (Interview 6: 2015). In line 
with this is Mr Ceballos Barón, who argues that the field of  world trade is very complex, and 
if  they do not demand and receive lobbyist input, they would not have the information on 
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what is happening (Interview 4: 2015). Furthermore, if  they do not receive input, they would 
not have new information on what and how to take action (Interview 4: 2015).  
!
There is no other way to learn that there is a problem until the industry, the business, the associations, the 
lobbyists come and raise our attention. Most of  the barriers that we face in trade and investment, we only 
discover when the industry and associations informs us…We need information. We have delegation in third 
countries that can gather information, but I mean the people who are in the front line, is the companies and they 
know what is going on (Interview 4: 2015).   !
It emerges that the Commission is very open towards lobbying stakeholders and are in a 
constant listening mode and that the majority of  employees within the Commission 
frequently demand input regarding issues on specific policy areas concerning their 
departments working field (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The interview responses from the 
Commission showed great variation regarding the specific demands requested. The reason for 
the varying types of  demands is because the input which is requested is specifically linked to 
the policy areas in which the employees work (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Another variation that 
becomes apparent is that the required expertise is used for different purposes. Mr. Ohridski 
specifies that the demanded input from lobbying stakeholders is used for legislative purposes 
(Interview 6: 2015). 
!
The purpose of  lobbying input is concerned with legislative matters as well as policy implementation, but 
also the work that comes after the implementation of  a policy or legislation. I am in need of  lobbying input 
throughout the whole legislative process, but the input is especially important early in the drafting stage of  
legislation (Interview 6: 2015).  !
 The demanded input is concerned with expertise data, statistics, good practices from 
lobbying stakeholders as well as their opinions on specific or general issues concerning the 
Commission (Interview 6: 2015). 
!
There is a constant hunger for evidence based analysis, so the Commission indicates what it is looking for 
and ask lobbying stakeholders - will this work, and if  so, why? (Interview 6: 2015).  !
Mr Ohridski’s demands for expertise is in line with how Bouwen defines the 
Commission’s needs of  lobbyists expertise knowledge in order to fulfill its role as the main 
legislator of  the EU. The responses from Mr Ohridski and Mr Ceballos Barón are in line with 
the theoretical type of  demand which states that the Commission is in need of  expert 
knowledge in order to pursue development of  effective EU legislation in a various policy areas 
"  OF "32 70
!
(Interview 4, 6: 2015, Bouwen 2002a: 8). However, the difference regarding the employees 
within the Trade Cabinet is that the expertise is not demanded in order to legislate as 
suggested in the theoretical framework, but rather to facilitate and develop beneficial trade 
prospects for European stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). As mentioned by Mr Ohridski, the 
demand for expertise is vital for the simple reason that the Commission does not have all the 
in-house expertise needed to produce effective legislation, which is in line with the theoretical 
assumption of  the Commission being understaffed and therefore in great need of  lobbying 
input (Interview 6: 2015, Bouwen 2002a: 14-15). 
!
Mrs Mungengová presents a different side regarding the Commission’s demand for 
lobbying expert knowledge and argues that there are no such demands (Interview 1: 2015).  
!
The Commissions first source of  expertise is its own groups, which is very qualified personal working in 
various DG’s. In addition to that, we get information from our 28 member states who have regulatory agencies, 
ministries, and again plenty of  competent personal over there, so this is our first source of  information and 
expertise. Then of  course as I said we are constantly being approached by lobbying stakeholders of  various kinds 
with their position papers, but the fact that they approach us does not necessarily mean that this is what the 
Commission is end up doing ultimately (Interview 1: 2015). !
Mrs Mungengová argues that the Commission’s expert groups that are the first and 
main source expertise (Interview 1: 2015). Therefore the Commission looks at facts, raw data 
and listen to other members of  the European Commission in other DG’s, MEPs, Members of  
Council, the Auditor institution, but also to the civil society (Interview 1: 2015). In contrast to 
this, Mr Ohridski stated that the Commission is seeking input through many different 
channels, for example expert groups (Interview 6: 2015). However, he says that the majority 
of  the existing expert groups within the Commission consist of  lobbyists’ as they have 
expertise knowledge and practical experience in specific areas that are of  interest to the 
Commission (Interview 6: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón was asked whether issues concerning 
trade matters normally are raised through the expert groups of  the Commission or straight to 
individual employees. He sounded somewhat inquiring and replied that the trade Cabinet 
does not have any expert groups and that the experts in the field are the businesses themselves 
or the representative associations (Interview 4: 2015). Thus, the interview responses from the 
Commission showed great variation regarding the specific demands requested. The reason for 
the varying types of  demands is because the requested expertise is specifically linked to which 
policy areas the employees are working in. Another variation that becomes apparent is that 
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the required expertise is used for different purposes. For example, Mr. Ohridski specifies that 
the requested input from lobbyists are used for legislative purposes which is in line with how 
Bouwen defines the Commission’s needs of  lobbyists EK, whilst Mr Ceballos Barón demands 
for EK is for non-legislative matters.  
!
Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)  
All interviews from the Commission showed a clear need for information on the 
European encompassing interest (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Regardless of  which department 
and within which policy area the interviewees are engaged in, it became evident that the 
information which is demanded is used to promote the common needs and interests of  
various sectors within the EU as a whole (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). This became evident as the 
Commission has the whole of  the EU and its citizens as its constituency. In order to satisfy the 
European interests, Mrs Mungengová argues as follows: 
!
…. we try to define the European interest based on core European values that are assigned in our Treaty. 
And this is also the reason why we don't lean to individual or particular constituencies to see here or there, 
because our constituencies is all European people. We have a European interest and represent the Union as a 
whole (Interview 1: 2015).  !
It is further argued that the Commission also listens to the business community, but that 
the role of  the Commission is strictly to then derive the European interest out of  all the 
information and present something which will be coherent enough to then secure majority 
approval in the co-decision process (Interview 1: 2015).  !
Therefore I can’t really say that because this or that big business company issues a statement that this is 
going to be the guiding source of  information for us. It is just one of  the many. One of  the many of  Avalanche 
of  information that we get. You need broad coalitions, which end up representing a variety of  European 
interests  (Interview 1: 2015).  !
The interview responses from the Commission showed that the only constituency and 
interest of  the Commission are the whole of  the EU and its citizens (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). 
As the Commission’s role is to represent the whole of  the EU and its citizens, it implies that it 
is in need of  facts and input from all types of  European interests. 
!
!
!
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Other findings  
One of  the interview responses suggests that the Commission’s demand for lobbying input is 
minimal and virtually non existing. This interview response does not correlate with the other 
interview responses from the Commission and is somewhat unexpected. However, it raises an 
interesting point of  view which shows a different view on the Commission’s need for exchange 
relations with lobbying stakeholders.  
!
One of  the initial interview questions asked the respondents what kind of  lobbyists they are 
mostly in contact with and why. Following this question, the eleven different types of  lobbying 
interests  which were identified by Chalmers were stated as alternatives (Chalmers 2011: 473). 5
There have been few objections to Chalmers definition of  which actors that are identified as 
lobbyists. However, during the interview with Mrs Mungengová, it was stressed that she 
makes a clear distinction between institutional and non-institutional stakeholders (Interview 1: 
2015). Institutional stakeholders are referring to actors that represent other European 
institutions or national institutions, for example, MEPs or persons from the Council, 
representatives of  regions as well as representatives from various Committees (Interview 1: 
2015). Furthermore, in order to ensure proper checks and balances in a democratic system, 
the Commission is obliged to make itself  available and to be accountable towards other 
institutional stakeholders (Interview 1: 2015).  
!
The institutional actors are not considered as lobbyists, because it is just normal democracy and all the 
others, we are not contacting them, this is something I wanted to stress, it is not us who pick up the phone or 
send emails to them and ask for input, it is rather them knocking on our doors, sending emails, callings us 
wanting to meet and to give their perspective on things (Interview 1: 2015).  !
This statement is very interesting considering how the academic literature perceives lobbying 
as well as who is included as preforming such representation, i.e., the kind of  representation 
that occurs from institutional actors such as local municipal bodies to the Commission, are 
not considered as activities which fall under the concept of  lobbying. Furthermore, it is clearly 
stated that no public actors deemed to be acting in lobbying spirit, since they belong in the 
realm of  Inter-European relations. This is interesting in relation to the fact that, for example, 
the City of  Malmö, among many others, has a representative resident in Brussels, whose 
purpose is to lobby for the city of  Malmö in itself  and for enforcing and fulfilling the desired 
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interests at EU level. This perspective indicates that lobbying should be understood as 
something that strictly takes place between private and public actors. Strong representation of  
interests among the public sector are considered part of  internal relationships and may even 
be considered to fall under normalized negotiations. In regard to non-institutional 
stakeholders, it is clarified that they are divided into three sub-groupings which is, business 
stakeholders, NGO stakeholders and self  employed people (Interview 1: 2015). !
In order to manage that flow of  demands, the Commission has also set up a social civic dialog, were four 
times a year we meet with more than 200 NGO type organizations present, were some are umbrella 
organizations, so one is present, but they represent maybe 40 others and this interaction with civil society is also 
a very important part of  how we interact with civil society, how we take on board their views, how we are also 
accountable to them on what we do and this is always web stream, i.e., public (Interview 1:2015).   !
Here it is stated that there are no demands from this part of  the Commission, but rather 
that the identified non-institutional stakeholders have created a flow of  demands, i.e., the 
lobbying stakeholders demand or are in need of  interacting with the Commission, not vice 
versa. When asked whether there is a need of  input from lobbyists, i.e., requests of  goods for 
trade negotiations etc, Mrs Mungengová answers;  
!
We do not even ask ourselves the question of  whether we need it, We get it!… Honestly, we don't demand 
input, we get it! We don't need to ask for it, it just flows on a daily basis in to our emails and so forward… 
(Interview 1: 2015).    
  
It is further explained that as the Commission receives a great amount of  information, 
they have to process it, since they are asked to react to it.  
!
… I would not say that we would not be able to propose policy issues or view legislative proposals without 
this kind of  input, but its just a part of  the normal reality and democratic society where people have views, 
people are allowed to create organizations, to represent their views…I don't think we where ever in a situation 
where we would be short of  information on the position of  one of  these actors (Interview 1: 2015).  !
 Moreover, Mrs Mungengová argues that the most natural thing which lobbyists do if  
they have a position, is to write it down and then send it to the Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament (Interview 1: 2015). However, it is explained that the Trade Cabinet receive 
requests of  meetings just to raise concerns even before lobbyists have a coherent position 
paper (Interview 1: 2015).  
!
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So I would really not say that we are the demanders here that need to ask positions. As soon as they have 
a view on something, or even before they have managed to comprehensively written it down, as soon as they 
actually have a concern, they will say we are concerned about this and this… could you please schedule a 
meeting with us. So the flow is really from them to us with respect to any concerns and ideas (Interview 1: 2015). !
This can be interpreted as a) meaning that they have demands but don't need to ask for 
it, or b) it means that the current system of  supply and demand is so ingrained that it is 
considered natural to receive the resources that is required without considering how it would 
look if  the flow of  information would not happen to the extent that it is described. Perhaps it 
is so that the present structure within the Commission which comprises enormous inflows of  
information is being perceived as a work of  organizing inflows, where the value of  the 
concrete needed information decreases. 
!
Mrs Mungengová often repeats that not only the Trade Cabinet, but also the 
Commission as a whole, does not demand and ask for input. This is very interesting and begs 
the question whether the responses, on occasions were pre-formulated in order to 
demonstrate the Commission's strength and independence. One would expect that there is a 
comprehensive review and consultation with stakeholders during the negotiations on the trade 
agreement between the EU and the USA, which is why it is unlikely that they don't need 
input. Thus, it implies that they might not ask for it, but they do need it. A close cooperation 
with trade companies and associations appears to be needed in order to be in agreement with 
stakeholders to anticipate European trading stakeholders with the best possible terms. Many 
aspects of  Mrs Mungengová’s interview responses are not personal but emerges to be more 
generally represented for the Commission. There is a lack of  clarity in why Mrs Mungengová 
considers the Commission relationship with lobbyists to be single-sided, i.e., lobbying actors 
demanding the Commission’s attention. It is not in line with any of  the other interview 
responses or the theoretical framework and seams to be formally compressed. It is said that 
the main source of  expertise that the Commission uses is their own expert groups and they do 
not ask for input, they simply receive it. At the same time it appears by the other interviewees 
from the Commission that their own expert groups mainly comprises of  lobbyists’ who are 
experts in each policy areas. One might assume that the need to obtain input from those 
which will be affected by the decisions to be made is fundamental within the EU system of  
governance. It seems that the institutional need for input may not be self-noticed or even 
reflected upon as the current situation of  information flow is described as an avalanche of  
information. 
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As we don't ask for anything specifically, we get what we get, so if  they come with just information that 
they have from their sources, then we get that. If  they come with coherent position papers, eventually a study 
that they have commissioned or any other outside evidence that we can use and also verify, then we will get that 
(Interview 1: 2015).  !
This response goes against Bouwen’s theory and is inconsistent with the idea of  
understanding lobbying as a phenomenon that occurs in terms of  an exchange between the 
actors involved as well as with the other interview responses from the Commission. In order 
to understand the content of  lobbying, Bouwen stresses the significance of  discerning the 
relationship between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials as an exchange relationship 
between two interdependent actors (Bouwen 2002a: 7). Bouwen highlights the EU institutions 
enthusiasm to interact with lobbyists as a response of  needing to have close contact with those 
possessing required goods, in order to fulfill their institutional work (Bouwen 2002a: 7). 
!
Mrs Mungengová follows the Cabinets relations with civil society and explains that 
there are two type of  lobbyists (Interview 1: 2015). It is further stated that there are those 
lobbyists who concentrate more on solutions and framing, meaning that they will criticize one 
thing, but at the same time they will reach out to the Commission with some concrete 
solutions or at least ideas on how things eventually could be solved (Interview 1: 2015). Then 
there are lobbyist who make the case of  only criticizing, and highlighting that there is a 
problem with policies in various areas, however they don't make the next step as contributing 
to the solution (Interview 1: 2015). It is further stated that, the more concrete the solution 
lobbyists can provide, the better for the Commission because it makes it easier for them to 
consider whether the presented may be something to look into, something to consider or not 
(Interview 1: 2015). 
!
One of  the general messenger that I always leave to civil society is: If  you have identified a problem in an 
area, please try to also think about how you think the problem should be solved. Because even if  you don't come 
up with the perfect solution, if  you come up with at least something for us to consider, it actually eases the way 
(Interview 1: 2015). !
Mrs Mungengová argues that if  lobbyists only criticize without providing any ideas on 
how they would like to see the issue improve, the Commission will have to come up with a 
solution that possibly could provide a just as dissatisfying outcome (Interview 1: 2015). !
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As with many things surrounding lobbying, there is a dichotomy between the interview 
responses from the Commission employees. Two out of  three interviewees are in line with the 
theoretical framework’s suggestions concerning the Commission’s demands for lobbying 
input. The majority of  the responses have shown that the Commission employees have a 
great demand for lobbying input regarding both expert knowledge and information about the 
European encompassing interests (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). In addition to this, it has also 
emerged that the Commission’s demands for lobbying input is not purely connected to 
legislative matters. Mr Ceballos Barón explained that the Trade cabinets work is not 
connected to legislation, with exception of  legal acts in trade policy which is very exceptional 
(Interview 4: 2015). It is further stated that as the Trade cabinet differs from other 
departments that defines legislation and that they are continuously in negotiations of  
international trade agreements listening to lobbying stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). Mr 
Ceballos Barón further explains that, in the international trade relations to the rest of  the 
world, they are in constant regular contact with business, stakeholders, lobbyists, consumers, 
governments in the EU, outside the EU, in the Parliament etc (Interview 4: 2015).  
!
!
4.1.2 The European Parliament 
!
The interviewees from the Parliament have generated great input regarding 
parliamentarian demands for lobbyism and also shown that there is a great difference 
between the type of  demands that is requested. All of  the interviewees have a great need for- 
and demand lobbying input. However, the type of  demands are depended on the individual 
MEPs personal interests as politicians as well as the specific needs for which Committees they 
are engaged in (Interview 2, 3, 5, 6: 2015). In opposition to the theoretical framework which 
suggest that the Parliament is concerned with IDIE as well as IEEI in order to evaluate the 
Commission’s legislative proposals from a European perspective (Bouwen 2002a: 8, 14), the 
empirics from the Parliament show that there is a need for all the three type of  demands 
included in the dependent variable, including expert knowledge (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). In 
other words, all of  the variables on type of  demands will be included in this section on the 
Parliament. The section will begin with addressing the demands connected to the theoretical 
framework and thereafter address other findings which have become evident through the 
empirical material.   
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Expert Knowledge (EK) 
According to the theoretical framework, this access good is only demanded by the 
Commission. It is argued that the Parliament’s legislative role does not require much EK, 
since the Commission at that time of  the process already drafted the details on often technical 
proposals (Bouwen 2002a: 14). However, the empirical material on the Parliament show that 
there is a demand for expertise input from lobbyists (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The 
interviewees demands for EK is much needed in order to fulfill their work and duties within 
the parliamentarian Committees (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The specific demands for EK is 
different for each interviewee from the Parliament as they all represent different political 
parties and are engaged in diverse Committees. The expertise knowledge which is demanded 
is also important for the Parliament in order to assess the legislative proposals which comes 
from the Commission. 
!
Mr Adaktusson demand EK from mainly NGOs concerning foreign affairs and human 
rights as these matters are of  main concern for his parliamentarian work (Interview 2: 2015). 
Furthermore, EK is demanded on transport related businesses and organizations issues due to 
his position as substitute in the transport Committee (Interview 2: 2015). One out of  many 
examples of  when Mr Adaktusson had a great result due to lobbyists’ EK input was 
concerning a transport directive, were the original proposals’ section on wages was very 
discriminatory for Sweden and Finland and this issue was raised though industry 
representatives (Interview 2: 2015). Mrs Björk stated that her parliamentarian work require 
EK from trade unions, feminist groups, environmental groups, gender equality movements as 
well as movements working for citizens’ rights such as migrant organizations and asylum 
seekers solidarity committees (Interview 3: 2015). These lobbying stakeholders and their input 
is vital for Mrs Björk as they assist her with EK and groundwork in her position as a member 
of  the Equality Committee (FEMM) and the Citizen Rights Committee (LIBE) (Interview 3: 
2015). The gained input provides Mrs Björk with new information and knowledge which is 
important and useful in her parliamentarian work as well as for her national party ideology 
(Interview 3: 2015). The demanded EK varies in form and can be information, reports and 
stakeholders agenda (Interview 3: 2015). 
!
I need input from democratic popular movements in my work in the parliament. As an MEP representing 
a Left Party it is of  utmost importance to have a dialogue with important social and popular movements, since it 
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is only through an alliance between progressive movements outside the parliament and progressive 
democratically elected parliamentarians that we strengthen citizens´ rights and reach progressive reforms….I am 
interested to listen to their views on specific issues (Interview 3: 2015). !
Mrs Lahdo stated to have a great need for specific information concerning stakeholders 
interests regarding the Committee work under which she works (Interview 5: 2015). 
Therefore, the type of  demands that are of  interest are concerned with EK on mapping 
positions on specific topics and policies for each Committee which she engages in (Interview 
5: 2015).  
!
For the Parliament it is important to get input from civil society and consider all aspects/effects of  
legislative proposals (Interview 5: 2015). !
Mrs Lahdo stated that the majority of  the demanded EK is used for legislative purposes 
and used as a foundation for being able to understand lobbying stakeholders interests before 
parliamentarian amendments are tabled (Interview 5: 2015).   
!
Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)  
The parliamentarian demands for lobbying input is stated to be important both in 
legislative matters as for non legislative purposes (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interview 
responses from the Parliament indicate that there are interests concerning the IEEI. The 
information on IEEI is demanded and needed from lobbying stakeholders in order to 
evaluate the Commission legislative proposals from a European perspective (Interview 2, 5: 
2015). This type of  input provides the Parliament with information about interests of  
European stakeholders, which is also beneficial depending on which Committees one is 
involved in (Interview 2, 3: 2015).  
!
Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)  
It emerges clearly that the interviewees from the Parliament’s demands for lobbying 
input are linked to their political agendas (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). As they are elected at 
national level and also the only directly elected institution, they are expected to represent the 
issues that they promised while campaigning. This implies that much of  the demands which is 
requested are linked to the issues and ideologies prioritized by their national party and its 
supporters, i.e., the people who voted them to the Parliament. It is therefore a matter of  
course that the MEPs are demanding input concerning IDEI. The requested information is 
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vital for the MEPs since they need to know the preferences of  their voters in order to increase 
their chances for re-election.   
!
All the interviewees from both the Commission and the Parliament were asked whether 
they consider the two institutions to have different needs and demands for lobbying input, and 
what the differences might be.   
!
…. not only when it comes to lobbyists input, but needs when it comes to information in general. 
Parliamentarians, of  course, are members that have been elected to the parliament directly, by a constituency in 
the member states. And these constituencies normally have some Interest and the parliamentarians are suppose 
to represent these interests (Interview 1: 2015).   !
It is further argued that the Parliament normally have to follow its constituencies 
interests in order to be re-elected and that MEPs therefore have a need for input from their 
constituencies for reinsurance of  representing those that have elected them to the Parliament 
(Interview 1:2015). In other words, MEPs agendas and the input they are seeking are driven 
by the interest of  their political party at national level as well as the interests of  which 
Committees they engage in. 
!
There are other objectives over political considerations between the Commission and the Parliament. 
MEPs are often driven by their constituency, so if  there is a particular concern of  a constituency of  one MEP or 
a group of  MEPs, they may propose new legislation to the Commission or try to seek some change in the current 
regulation. The origin is different, as the MEPs are often driven by constituency and in our case, the 
constituency is the whole of  all business in general (Interview 4: 2015). !
It is argued that MEPs interact from a perspective based on their domestic interests from their 
constituencies and that MEPs get their legitimacy from direct democracy since they are the 
only ones within the EU that is directly elected (Interview 6: 2015).  
!
They say that they are close to the public and that they speak for the citizens, however, they have been 
elected with an agenda, meaning that they have to represent the interests of  their country or their local 
constituency. They are not civil servants, they are politicians who are elected and accountable to their own 
constituency which is the one that can re-elect them if  they consider that the MEPs have defended their interests 
in Brussels and Strasbourg effectively (Interview 6: 2015). !
The empirical findings on the MEPs type of  demands are consistent with Bouwen’s 
findings on the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input, with one exception. It becomes 
evident that the Parliament require IDIE of  its constituency and IEEI in order to mobilize 
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their interests and increase its chances for re-election (Interview 1, 3, 4, 5, 6: 2015). However, 
the interviewees also demand EK, which is a contribution to the theoretical framework.  
!
Other findings 
Similar to Mrs Mungengová, Mrs Björk did not agree with this thesis use of  Chalmers 
definition on the notion lobbyist and disapprove of  referring to those she interacts with as 
lobbyists (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Björk has a clear idea about what those she meets with are, 
in relation to what a definition of  a ”lobbyist in Brussels” includes (Interview 3: 2015). 
!
…. first of  all I would like clarify the word “lobbyist”. The majority of  lobbyists in Brussels are very well 
paid men representing big corporations and banks. Their only goal is to protect the interests of  this 
corporation/bank. In short: to protect their profits. These lobbyists are active vis à vis the EU-commission and 
the EU-parliament…..There is obviously a huge distinction from the lobbyists protecting corporate interests/
profits and civil society (Interview 3: 2015). !
This is a very strong description of  what lobbying is perceived as. It is furthermore not 
in line with any of  this thesis’ defining remarks on the meaning of  the concept lobbying. This 
interpretation on the context of  lobbying is neither coherent with the European Parliament’s 
definition on lobbying as ”a concentrated effort to influence policy formulation and decision-
making with a view to obtain some designated results from government authorities and 
elected representatives” (Zibold 2013: 1), which furthermore confirms the European 
Parliament’s concern regarding the non-existing consensus on what the lobbying profession 
includes. Mrs Björk further argues that there are stakeholder representatives which are called 
“lobbyists” within the EU-system, who represent important popular and democratic 
movements (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Björk stated that she obviously meet with representatives 
of  public authorities, regions and municipalities as well as members of  parliaments (Interview 
3: 2015). However, the most important factor is that the lobbyists she interacts with are 
representing democratic values, and that their goal is to defend certain values such as social 
rights, social justice, gender equality, workers’ rights, health and environmental standards 
(Interview 3: 2015). 
!
As clearly indicated through the interviewee responses, there is a need and demand for 
lobbying input in order to achieve the desired outcomes of  their parliamentarian agendas 
(Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interviewee responses from the Parliament are of  great value 
and clearly indicate that there are institutional demand for lobbying input regarding EK, 
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IEEI, IDEI and information on how the EU future decisions will affect the course of  various 
lobbying stakeholders, new knowledge, mapping positions and stakeholders views on options 
on course of  action (Interview 1, 2, 3, 5, 6: 2015). 
!
!
4.1.3 Analytical comparison of  demands 
!
A noticeable difference between the interviewees is the perception of  what lobbyist 
input means. Some differentiate between institutional and non-institutional lobbying 
stakeholders, others categorize lobbying stakeholders along specific areas of  interest, while 
others accepted Chalmers eleven identified actors as lobbyists. Evidently, this contributes to 
that the interviewees from the Commission and the Parliament, experience their demands 
and need for input in different ways. 
!
The analysis shows that the Parliament demand for lobbying input are different from 
the ones that the Commission needs. The Parliament’s members have to take into account 
national interests in order to satisfy the constituents who elected them to represent and drive 
certain issues at European level. This is vital for MEPs to demand in order to know the 
preferences of  their voters and increase their chances for re-election. This kind of  input is not 
of  importance for the Commission. As the Commission’s constituency and its interest is the 
whole of  Europe, it has no need for information on particular domestic issues. This was 
especially stressed by Mr Ceballos Barón who stated that the Trade Cabinet serves European 
firms, business, exporting and importing interests and consumers who want to benefit from 
open trade and having access to getting cheaper products. In other words, they serve the 
European trading interests in order to keep the European market open for consumers and 
business. The Commission is in need of  knowledge of  the European interests to be able to act 
as a promoter of  European interests. As clearly stated by Mr Ceballos, the Trade Cabinet has 
great demand for expertise knowledge from the business stakeholders which knows what 
current issues of  trade there is. They welcome the know-how from lobbying stakeholders in 
order to take an appropriate course of  action. It is important to mention is that some of  the 
demands for lobbyists’ input from both the Commission and the Parliament are not linked to 
the legislative process alone, which differs from Bouwen’s identified institutional demands.  
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There appears to be a difference in the scope of  input that is needed and demanded 
between the Commission and the Parliament. It becomes clear that the Parliament demands 
more input in a variety of  fields and are interested in expert input as well as general 
information, while the Commission employees are interested the specific policy areas in which 
they work and consult widely within the specific sectors (Interview 2, 3, 4, 6: 2015).   
!
Parliament has more use for expertise since the Commission is more specialized in different topics while 
members of  the European Parliament need to have knowledge in all topics. But the earlier in the political 
process that the input is made – the better (Interview 2: 2015). !
As the Commission holds the pen first, it is evident that they need to interact more 
intensively when proposing and drafting legislation. The Parliament is in a position where 
they are mainly making amendments which puts the Commission and the Parliament in 
different positions when demanding lobbying input for legislative purposes. This affect the 
type of  demands which are required. The Commission has a European Public interest and 
are divided into specialized policy areas of  EU competence. Due to the Commissions setting, 
every department of  policy area has to consult widely with relevant stakeholders, while as the 
Parliament has personal interests as politicians as well as interests varying due to which 
Committees they are engaged in, which means that their scope on type of  demands can differ 
widely.   
!
!
4.2 The degree of  interdependence 
!
In the process to depict whether the interviewees as well as the textual material 
demonstrates a higher or lower degree of  interdependence, the overall impression as well as 
the specific indicators played a role. The material regarding how frequently requests occur, 
the types of  demands and how the discourse of  the interviewees and their relationship with 
lobbyists is described, are important factors to consider in the analysis regarding the degree of  
interdependence. The specific factors which served as indicators of  interdependence are: 
mutual exchange, resource dependency and organizational structure. With these factors as a 
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base, this thesis has been able to discern whether the empirical material demonstrates high or 
low degree of  interdependence to lobbyism.  
!
!
4.2.1 The European Commission 
!
Mutual exchange 
The empirical material from the Commission shows a great need to maintain exchange 
relations with lobbying stakeholders in order to pursue enhanced policy-making (Interview 4, 
6: 2015). Two out of  three interviewees from the Commission stated that they actively seek to 
interact with relevant lobbying stakeholders in order to exchange vital goods (Interview 4, 6: 
2015). The third interviewee stated that regardless of  the institutional will of  interacting is 
there or not, there is a constant contact, in which the Commission is compelled to respond to 
the inquiries of  the requested exchange relations (Interview 1: 2015). 
!
The Commission seeks input and does this in many different ways, formally, informally, directly, and 
indirectly. Formally through public consultation by Green papers, by specific EU funded projects or by events. 
But also informally by discussions with interests group representatives. In other setting one might receive input 
through expert groups, were many of  the existing ones within the Commission are lobbyists. And you need in 
fact both expert input as well as wide consultations in order to receive input. There is a need and practical 
reason for demanding lobbying input (Interview 6: 2015). !
Mr Ohridski is in contact with lobbyists frequently, meaning three or more times a week. 
He is in contact with all of  the eleven identified lobbying actors as the spectrum of  interests 
covering the transparency register is wide and of  inclusive nature (Interview 6: 2015). 
However, there is a more intense contact with the professional consultancies, trade 
associations, NGOs and lately local authorities due to particular issues (Interview 6: 2015). Mr 
Ceballos Barón stated that the Trade Cabinet are in constant contact with business, 
stakeholders, lobbyists, but also consumers, governments in the EU, outside the EU, in the 
Parliament in order to exchange needed goods (Interview 4: 2015). The Commission’s need to 
have a close relation of  exchanging goods with lobbyists are a substantial part of  how they 
receive what is needed to carry out their work. When asking whether the relation to lobbying 
stakeholders and the received input is important to their work, it became evident that is it 
crucial. 
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Yes, absolutely! There is simply no other way to do it, you can not work behind closed doors and design 
policies without hearing from all sides that will be affected by your policies. You need to be informed about all 
the pros and cons and the ones that are unsure, and after this you take decisions, and you form the evidence 
based on decision. This is not possible if  you do not hear all sides. Lobbying input contribute to a solid ground 
for policy-making. The whole quality of  law making is enhanced through the various stages of  consultation and 
input (Interview 6: 2015).  !
It was further stated that there is a strong sense of  interdependence to lobbyism. 
!
Yes, if  interdependence means that the policy makers need the lobbyists in order to understand the 
impact of  what they are designing, vis a vis the lobbyists need the policy-makers in order to make sure that 
regulations and legislation works on the ground. It is a mutual exchange since the institutional actors need to 
know what is going on in order to form policies, and the lobbyists need to voice their opinions and concerns to 
the policy-makers (Interview 6: 2015). !
Resource dependence 
The empirical material indicate that there is a dependency on the resources that 
lobbying stakeholders possesses (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The resources which are requested are 
specific for each policy sector in the Commission (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón 
stress the fact that they collect a large amount of  information by listen and interacting with a 
lot of  lobbying stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). It is further stated that as their work is not 
about drafting regulation, they are not like other departments that defines legislation on, e.g., 
migration or taxation. Therefore, they are continuously in negotiations of  international 
agreements, listening to and exchanging vital resources with various stakeholders: ”we are in 
constant contact with business, consumers, third countries etc” (Interview 4: 2015). Mr 
Ceballos illustrates an example of  how it could look on a daily basis and states that:  
!
Usually lobby companies, industry associations, farmers associations raise a problem that they are facing, 
which in turn leads to us taking action (Interview 4: 2015).  !
In other words, there is a great need for the resources that lobbying stakeholders 
possesses in order to know how to facilitate beneficial trade for European stakeholders. Either 
the Trade Cabinet has an agreement in place and use the channels of  the agreement, or there 
is no agreement and then they use the channels to try to eliminate or ease these barriers and 
facilitate trade (Interview 4: 2015).  
!
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We talk to all stakeholders on issues regarding that…We are in a lot of  contact with lobbyists in the sense 
of  industry associations that are involved in trade, and today everybody is involved in trade (Interview 4: 2015). !
Mr Ceballos stated that the lobbying input which is demanded and received are an 
important and vital part of  his work.  
!
Lobbyists are our stakeholders, because we work for firms, business, exporting and importing but also for 
those consumers who want to benefit from open trade and having access to getting cheeper products. So we have 
to keep the market of  Europe open for consumers and business (Interview 4: 2015).  !
It is further argued that the Trade Cabinet is not aware of  problems until lobbyists 
inform them about the problem (Interview 4: 2015). This indicates that there would be a 
considerable lack of  opportunities on how to promote European trade without lobbying input 
and the resources which they provide. He stresses the importance of  discussing with the 
business industry, for the simple reason that they are the ones who know exactly how it works.  
!
We have cases everyday of  were lobbyists input and information is vital for our knowing. They inform us, 
and we take action (Interview 4: 2015). !
Mr Ohridski which was a part of  setting up the transparency register stated that the process 
of  outlining the register would not have been possible without the resources of  lobbying 
stakeholders (Interview 6: 2015).  
!
What information should we ask for, what should be the different headings of  disclosure and also in 
developing the guideline around the disclosure regime - We consulted externally, and we were discussing with 
many stakeholders on each of  the various six sections. When we had the first draft of  guidelines, we asked them 
what they thought and they came back with feedback and tactical suggestions for amendments. We demand 
certain kind of  information such as cost revenues, address, policies they work on etc. As it is not we who fill in 
the register, it is the registrants, it has to make sense to them, practically, but also in terms of  what we are asking 
from them, there is no point to be overly bureaucratic or to ask for something that does not make sense to them. 
The building of  the transparency register is an example of  how lobbying resources helped us to shape what I 
think is now a good compromise of  a public disclosure regime (Interview 6: 2015).   !
The interviewees showed that the demanded resources are of  great importance for the 
functioning of  their work as well as their ability to implement it effectively (Interview 4, 6: 
2015). The resources which are demanded differs depending on which of  the various policy 
sectors within the Commission are in need. There is a frequent demand for lobbying 
resources which indicate a relation of  resource dependence (Interview 4, 6: 2015).  
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Organizational Structure 
The interview material emphasizes that the organizational structure of  the Commission 
makes them more dependent on lobbying input (Interview 3, 4, 6: 2015). It is stated that the 
definite need for lobbying input is nothing new within the Commission (Interview 6: 2015). 
This has been the case since the institutions was established, however, the institutional 
demands for lobbying input has been intensified over the years due to the EU’s growth in 
areas of  competence (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The current organizational structure which has 
formed the great need for lobbying input intensified after the Single European Act and after 
the Lisbon Treaty due to the extension of  the ordinary legislative procedure to more areas 
(Interview 6: 2015). This means that, as the competences and the legislative outreach of  the 
EU has increased, it has created a great demand for a large scope of  competences and 
representatives that could assist building a solid ground for the outcome of  European 
legislation (Interview 6: 2015). As the Commission holds the pen first, they need to interact 
more intensively when proposing and drafting legislation (Interview 6: 2015). The 
expectations on the Commission to be well informed but also to possess solid expertise while 
producing legislation is great and have led to the Commission being obliged to widely consult 
with stakeholders before, during and after legislation.  
!
Art 11 states that the Commission should consult widely, not the other institutions. Why? Because it is the 
institutions who work for the general interest of  the Union (Interview 6: 2015).  !
The empirical material from the Commission strongly indicates that it does not have the 
resources to independently produce legislation (Interview 4, 6: 2015). It is stated that the 
Commission is a relatively small institution which in relation to its areas of  competence are 
understaffed and does not have all the in-house competences needed to be able to cover 
legislation in all the EU areas of  competence (Interview 6: 2015). It is further stated that the 
Commission’s need for lobbying input is very sector oriented due to the specific areas of  
competences within each DG and Cabinet (Interview 6: 2015). In other words, the 
organizational structure of  the Commission is organized in a matter that makes them more 
dependent on lobbying input (Interview 6: 2015). 
!
Each DG and sector within the Commission is responsible for specific policy development, meaning that 
each sector has their own lobbyists that are of  certain interest in regard to their work in progress (Interview 6: 
2015).  
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This implies that the Commission’s division of  policy sector oriented departments desire 
specific knowledge and know-how techniques for each policy field, which is virtually 
impossible to obtain in-house due to the very detailed areas of  knowledge expected to be 
covered as well as the fact that the Commission is understaffed in relation to its work load. 
These features indicate that the current organizational structure is built in such a way that 
makes the Commission dependent on external inputs in order to carry out what is intended. 
!
There is a need and practical reason for demanding input (Interview 6: 2015).  !
The speeches held by Commissioner Mr Šefčovič depict that the organizational 
structure of  the Commission has create interdependence between the Commission's work and 
lobbyists, as it needs to involve external actors for enhanced functionality. The speech starts 
with stressing that the aim of  the Transparency Register is not to impose stigmatization of  
partner stakeholders to be named and shamed, but rather the opposite (europa.eu 2011). The 
aim is to demonstrate to the public, that the registered organizations are committed to ethical 
standards, and that the EU policy-making is fed by various contributors which legitimately 
share their viewpoints (europa.eu 2011). He further states that the aim is to make the policy-
making process transparent and within an ethical framework which is expected by the 
institutions and the citizens of  EU. This statement can be interpreted as raising the 
importance of  the current lobbying efforts in the EU as a great part of  the policy-making 
process which needs to become as transparent to the public as the work of  the institutions are 
expected to be, i.e., it is a contributing factor which is needed in the institutions and therefor 
has to be more public in order to be legitimate. The majority of  the speech can be 
understood as the Transparency Register’s aim is to legitimate and improve lobbyists 
reputation in order for the EU institutions to be able to exchange goods with them and 
demand their resources as they wish, without being questioned. The speech ends with an 
announcement of  two new features that will be added into the system. The first feature is 
presented as follows: 
!
 Not only will registered entities receive an alarm each time the Commission launches a public 
consultation in their field of  interest, but they will also receive the roadmaps made public every year, along with 
the Work Program of  the Commission (europa.eu 2011). !
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 The second feature to be added is concerned with: ”…the opening of  an additional 
module on-line which will make it possible for registered entities to use the Register web 
interface to introduce their request for the accreditation of  their representatives and their fast-
track access to the Parliament’s buildings” (europa.eu 2011). These upcoming additions 
insinuate that there is a desire to achieve further integration with lobbying stakeholders by 
making it easier for lobbyists to participate by increasing the availability of  information, needs 
and demands. In other words, the availability for institutional actors and lobbying 
stakeholders to maintain mutual exchange relations eases with the additions of  the 
transparency register.  
!
Mr Šefčovič stressed the importance of  a close cooperation of  responsibility between 
the Commission and the coming Public affairs professionals. The speech was held ten days 
after the European Parliament elections last year and was dedicated to discuss the direction in 
which the Commission and the lobbying community of  Brussels collectively should take to act 
more effectively in addressing the European citizens concerns and how to do so while moving 
forward in a positive spirit (neurope.eu 2014). In order to achieve a more effective way of  
addressing the citizens concerns, Mr Šefčovič stated there is a need to communicate with a 
clearer message. 
!
This means that we have to build support and coalitions. Member States, Parliamentarians, but also 
stakeholders cannot stand by and leave the communication job to the Commission whereas everyone else focuses 
on criticizing …it seems clear to me that we still need to work on transparency. Now, I believe that the 
Commission is one of  the most transparent organisations in the world, with a commitment to wide consultation, 
open law-making and high quality impact assessments that are second to none. (neurope.eu 2014).  !
The focus is on transparency and the image on how lobbying in relation to the 
Commission is perceived by the media and citizens in general. He further states that the 
image that the media presents of  the Commission’s relation with lobbyists is as far from the 
reality as possible and that external influence and pressure is a regular occurrence which has 
been present since the emergence of  the EU (neurope.eu 2014). However, he clearly points 
out that the image is tangibly present and need action to transformed for the better. 
!
They see the Commission's commitment – in fact, its obligation under the Treaties – to consult widely on 
legislative proposals as opening the process up to undue influence. This is the perception of  lobbying in Brussels 
– as widely reported in the EU media over the last few months – and it is undoubtedly a difficult image to 
dispel” (neurope.eu 2014).  
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The issues are concerned with the media which claims that there are as many lobbyists 
in Brussels as there is staff  in the Commission (approx. 30 000), and that these shady actors 
influence up to 75% of  EU legislation (neurope.eu 2014). He argues that with these figures, it 
is obvious that citizens might be disillusioned with the legitimacy of  the EU. However, he 
states that this is of  course far from the case in reality (neurope.eu 2014). It is further stated 
that the constant interaction between the Commission officials and lobby groups does not mean 
that the Commission is under bribery to represent their interests (neurope.eu 2014).     
!
And yet, meetings between officials and stakeholders on a wide range of  policy areas, and representing 
every side of  the argument, take place on a daily basis in Brussels. How else can the Commission – as the main 
proposer of  legislation – ensure that it does intelligently and effectively, in a balanced way that tries to take into 
account all points of  view? Would critics prefer that the Commission remained entirely aloof, taking decisions 
that could affect millions of  Europeans, without bothering to ask about the potential repercussions? (neurope.eu 
2014).  !
The content of  the speech is very relevant in the sense that the overall thread is 
perceived as a matter of  confirming his own and/or the internal views on lobbying and 
lobbyists as part of  the EU machinery. It is often clarified that as a Commissioner or an 
employee of  the Commission, it is an obligation to consult widely with stakeholders such as 
citizens, national parliaments, NGOs and with the industry as part of  the legislative proposal 
procedure (neurope.eu 2014). The speech ends with a positive encouragement to the young 
public affairs professionals in the audience.  
!
…I count on you, as the next generation of  lobbyists, to be at the forefront of  showing that you too are 
committed to acting openly and proactively. As the new generation of  EU lobbyists, will be part of  that battle – 
ensuring the reputation of  your industry does not suffer by making contributions to the development of  future EU policies, 
alongside the myriad of  other stakeholders involved in that process…..I am sure I can count on your support in 
this shared endeavour (neurope.eu 2014). !
This is consistent with the statements made by both Mr Ohridski and Mr Ceballos 
Barón who argues that the lobbying input which they demand and receive are of  much 
importance for the functioning of  their work (Interview 4, 6: 2015). 
!
 We are always in a listening mode for input and they are a very good source of  information. We cant 
replace the kind of  resources that we get from business (Interview 4: 2015).  !
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The interdependence between institutional actors and lobbying stakeholders can be 
connected to the regulation concerning transparency which is being implemented more 
intensively within the EU. Regulation of  lobbying made in the EU, USA, Canada and the UK 
has, according to Naurin, a common basis for the initiative. The background to the 
regulations have very little to do with serious attempts to stop lobbying influence over policy, 
but is more about a kind of  symbolic politics (Naurin 2001). The proposals to introduce 
increasing regulations in relation to lobbying is thus about politicians' attempts to demonstrate 
decisiveness. Lobbyists are regarded with distrust by the public, and the media describes 
lobbying as a shady and undemocratic phenomenon. This image motivates politicians' actions 
to regulate more, which in the public eye can be perceived as driving attempts to strengthen 
democracy (ibid). However, there are arguments suggesting that the democratic beliefs, that 
formed the basis for the regulating decisions, have been highly unclear in terms of  
achievement (ibid). Greenwood and Thomas argue that these kind of  regulations have no 
impact on lobbyists’ ability to impact and participate in politics: ”Lobby regulation is never 
likely to restructure interest intermediation” (Greenwood & Thomas 1998: 498). The 
European Parliament has stated that ”Widespread lobbying in the EU institutions has led to 
criticism regarding the transparency and accountability of  the EU's decision-making process” 
(Mańko et al. 2014: 2). This statement is in line with both Naurin, Greenwood and Thomas 
arguments of  using regulations as a symbolic tool for politics. Organizations which lack a 
functioning structure for coordinating activities among social components can experience 
their interdependency to others as a problem which causes uncertainties or unpredictability 
of  outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 42-43). Organizations who perceive that they are 
facing uncertainty, tend to handle the situation by restructuring their exchange relationships. 
When trying to resolve their uncertainties regarding outcomes, organizations tend to increase 
their interdependence in relation to behavior, meaning that they inter-structure their 
behaviors in ways predictable for each other (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43). The most ordinary 
solution for organizations to deal with issues of  interdependence and uncertainty entails 
increasing coordination (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 42-43). Furthermore, it also leads to 
increasing the mutual control over each others’ activities, i.e., intensifying the behavioral 
interdependence of  the social actors (ibid). The degree of  interdependency between actors 
can change over time as organizations become more or less self-reliant (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978: 43). 
!
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The activities of  organizations such as the EU will always involve exchanges with other 
actors. Since organizations are not independent or self-sufficient, they depend on the external 
actors to provide relevant resources and support (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43). The lobbying 
actors which provide organizations with what their diverse needs are, will in return require 
certain actions (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 44), which is in line with Bouwen's supply and 
demand approach to the relationship between private and public actors. 
!
The interview responses from the Commission indicate and confirm the hypothesis 
concerning the link between interdependency and the degree of  demanded input. Through 
the interview, it becomes clear that the interviewee which represented the view that there is 
non-interdependence between herself  and lobbyists, also had no demands for lobbying input 
(Interview 1: 2015). Hence, the interviewee communicated a low degree of  interdependence 
towards lobbyists which corresponds to a low or according to the interviewee, a non existing 
degree of  demand (Interview 1: 2015). However, the interview material from Mr Ceballos 
Barón and Mr Ohridski shows a diverse side of  the Commission, were there is a constant 
demand for lobbying input as well as a high degree of  interdependence, since it is stated that 
they could not fulfill their duties if  there were no input (Interview 4, 6: 2015). One side of  the 
trade Cabinet indicate that parts of  the Commission has no need or demand for lobbying 
input as they are fully equipped internally, while the other interview from the trade Cabinet as 
well as Mr Ohridski from the Transparency unit indicates that there is a great demand for 
frequent interaction with lobbyists in order to ensure steady input which is highly needed. 
!
!
4.2.2 The European Parliament 
!
Mutual exchange 
The empirical material on the Parliament indicate that having a close and frequent 
contact with lobbying stakeholders are a key aspect for many MEPs. All the interviewees from 
the Parliament stated that they meet with lobbyists frequently in order to exchange goods or 
to interact in order to be updated on current news (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). Mr Adaktusson 
meets with lobbyists frequently and says that he often is in need of  input and demand certain 
information regarding the fields in which he is engaged in as a politician and as a member of  
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Committees (Interview 2: 2015). Mr Adaktusson is in contact with all of  the eleven identified 
kind of  lobbyists regarding different topics (Interview 2: 2015). He considers the gained input 
as valuable, considering lobbyists knowledge on certain issues (Interview 2: 2015). 
!
 If  politicians make laws that affect civil society, businesses and jobs we should listen to them before 
making decisions that affect them (Interview 2: 2015) !
Mrs Björk is also in frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders (Interview 3: 2015). 
The close involvement requires that she has a frequent dialogue and contact with NGOs and 
their representatives to be able to keep up with their activities in Committees and to be 
updated on information she needs (Interview 3: 2015). The organizations and lobbyists that 
Mrs Björk meets with, have solid knowledge on specific issues and reports on the parliament’s 
agenda which is of  great need for her parliamentarian work (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Lahdo is 
in line with the MEPs and are in frequent contact with a variety of  lobbying stakeholders 
including especially professional associations, public affairs consultancies, academic 
organizations, NGOs and associations of  NGOs (Interview 5: 2015). The interviewees from 
the Parliament demonstrates a close and frequent cooperation with lobbying stakeholders 
characterized by mutual exchange (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interviewees regular contact 
with lobbyists facilitate the requested demands for input easier as the availability increases. 
!
Resource dependence 
The relationship between MEPs and lobbying stakeholders are an elementary and 
important part of  their everyday work as politicians as well as for their work in the 
parliamentarian Committees (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The empirics show that goods which 
lobbying stakeholders possesses are often demanded and that these goods are very important 
for the MEPs ability to carry out their parliamentary agendas (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015).  
!
Lobbyists are a substantial part of  the European Parliament's work. I believe that lobbying is an essential 
part of  the parliamentary process. Policy formulation would be weak without their contributions…. Lobbyists 
provide useful information (and MEPs are) smart enough to realise that the information they get is subjective, 
Alexander Stubb, former member of  the EPP-ED Group, Finland, now Foreign Minister (European Parliament 
2007a). !
Lobbying, taken for itself, is something positive. We (MEPs) welcome everybody that can contribute 
something, said Committee Chairman, German Socialist Jo Leinen (European Parliament 2007).  
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The Finish Prime Minister and former member of  the EPP-ED Group Alexander 
Stubb, drafted a report on lobbying in the EU institutions, with the intention to highlight the 
decision-making process in Brussels (European Parliament 2007a). The main point of  the 
report is stressing the importance of  improving their work with lobbyists in order to enjoy 
legitimacy and exchange resources (European Parliament 2007a). Mrs Lahdo stated that her 
frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders are important in order to facilitate the resources 
which she needs (Interview 5: 2015). 
!
Lobbying input brings a valuable insight to proposals consequences in reality, since it brings valuable 
expertise and information (Interview 5: 2015).  !
Mrs Björk considers the Commissions need for lobbying resources to be overly 
dependent (Interview 3: 2015). However, regarding her own demands for lobbying resources, 
she emphasizes the importance of  interest representation input as well as their resources and 
refers to a specific moment when she was visiting Sicily during the Lampedusa disaster. 
During this time, she meet representatives of  humanitarian organizations as well as Italian 
organizations, from whom she gained a lot of  knowledge and learned facts and practicalities 
on the effects of  the EU asylum policies and effects of  the EU’s Frontex structures (Interview 
3: 2015). 
!
 These facts and the knowledge I gained from them has been very important in my work in the Citizen 
Rights Committee (LIBE), for the human rights of  asylum seekers (Interview 3: 2015). !
Organizational Structure 
The Parliament’s organizational structure seems to play a role in their dependence on 
lobbying stakeholders. As politicians and representatives of  the European citizens, they are 
expected to have a close relation to civil society, to be well informed regarding issues that the 
Commission proposes as the Parliament with the Council jointly are finalizing most 
legislation, but also to follow their political agendas and the priorities which it comes with. 
Their political ideology are important in relation to their specific demands since, for example, 
liberals often promotes business and industry development, which imply that they will have 
increased contact with such representatives. Likewise, politicians to the left tend to have strong 
ties to NGOs to advocate certain issues and in the same line, ecologists tends have close 
contact with environmental movements, etc. In other word, the Parliament working structure 
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is built in a matter which makes them dependent on having a close relation to lobbying 
stakeholders which can assist them in specific policy issues. 
!
Mr Adaktusson stated that he considers lobbyists as ordinary people that live and 
operate in a world that the politicians decide upon (Interview 2: 2015). As regards to whether 
Mr Adaktusson would say that there is an interdependence between politicians, officials and 
lobbyist:  
!
…. it’s a symbiosis. We need their information and they should have all the right to inform us (Interview 
2: 2015). !
This statement is very straightforward, and the author of  this paper understands this 
implicitly as him viewing the relationship with lobbyists as an interaction between two 
different actors living in close association, to the advantage of  both, i.e., actors with a strong 
correlation of  interdependency.  
!
Other findings 
When asking the interviewees whether the Parliament and the Commission are 
interdependent to lobbying stakeholders in different ways, Mrs Björk had a strong view on 
this matter. Mrs Björk depicts the differences of  the Parliament and the Commissions 
interdependence to lobbying stakeholders to be vast in regard to how much consideration is 
given to lobbyist input (Interview 3: 2015). She argues that the Commission gives priority to 
the corporate lobbyists, which in turn affects their interdependence with theses actors 
(Interview 3: 2015). 
!
The Commission has several members who themselves are coming from top positions in corporations, 
banks and lobbyism, so the links in between the two are also on a direct personal level. In the parliament there is 
also a huge corporate lobby influence, but it depends on the MEPs political background and their independence 
(Interview 3: 2015). !
Mrs Björk distrust’s the Commission on whether their relations with various interests is 
to the benefit for the European public interest. This paper does not address whether the 
different institutional demands are performed in accordance with democratic values or not, 
but it is an interesting impression that possibly could answer to why there are variations and 
whether political position and ideology affect the attitude towards the interaction with various 
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lobbying stakeholders. In contrast to how Mrs Björk depicts the Commission's problematic 
relationship with lobbyists, there are other MEPs expressing their concern over 
parliamentarians dependence on lobbyists. 
!
On the other hand Luxembourg Green Claude Turmes sees the "huge dependence on lobby advice (as) a 
weakness.” He said it would be better if  MEPs had larger staffs to gather independent information (European 
Parliament 2007).  !
Mrs Björk further develops on what the considerations of  the major differences between 
the Commission and the Parliament are and gives an example of  how she reasons: 
!
The most important difference is that corporate lobbyist are given priority by the EU-Commission, take 
the TTIP-negotiations as an example out of  the Commissions 560 meetings with external representatives in 
2012 – 2013 (DG Trade not counted) 92% were with corporation lobbyists, only 4% with representatives of  civil 
society and 4% with experts from universities and authorities. (Interview 3: 2015).  !
The author assumes that she implies that the interdependence between the Commission 
and corporate lobbyism is a major problem of  the EU (Interview 3: 2015). 
!
The interviewees from the Parliament confirms that there is a demand for lobbying 
input to such a degree that meetings and requesting input occur frequently. The interviewees 
from the Parliament indicate relations to lobbying stakeholders as characterized by mutual 
exchange, resource dependency and that the organizational structure of  how they work 
reflects a high degree of  interdependence. This is therefore also in accordance with this thesis’ 
hypothesis, which imply that there is a correlation between the degree of  interdependence 
and the amount and type of  demands. The hypothesis aimed to test whether a high degree of  
interdependence leads to more demands, which is confirmed in this case. 
!
!
4 .2 .3 Ana ly t i ca l compar i son on the deg ree o f  
Interdependence 
!
The degree of  interdependence has been used as the independent variable in order to 
measure the dependent variable of  types of  demand, and has proven to give great results in 
terms of  empirical outcomes. The empirical material confirmed that the majority of  
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interviewees relation to lobbyists is characterized by interdependence. There is one non-
confirming empirical source in the empirical material, which is the interview with Mrs 
Mungengová. It suggested that there is no demand for lobbying input and no sense of  
interdependence. However, the confirming empirics showed that in the cases where frequent 
contact with lobbyists occur, there is more demand and need for lobbying input, i.e., the 
higher the degree of  interdependence between lobbyists and institutional actors, the more 
demand for lobbying input. These cases also confirmed that the organizational structure plays 
a large role in the type of  demands as well as how often it is required. 
!
During Mr Ceballos Barón's interview it became clear that the structure of  the trade 
Cabinet is organized in such a manner that it makes them dependent on lobbyists’ input and 
their resources in order to be able to facilitate European trade. They are therefore in constant 
contact with lobbying stakeholders to exchange resources. The gained resources are described 
as of  great importance and irreplaceable (Interview 4: 2015). In the speeches held by Mr 
Šefčovič, a need for closer cooperation between the Commission and the lobbying community 
of  Brussels is depicted. The speeches further indicate that there is a desire to build stronger 
support and coalitions between the Commission and lobbyists in order to collectively work on 
the development of  EU policies (neurope.eu 2014). Mr Ohridski stated that there is simply no 
other way to work than to include lobbying stakeholders in the process and that their input is 
frequently demanded as ”there is a need and practical reason for demanding lobbying 
input” (Interview 6: 2015). Mrs Björk’s frequent contact and demand for lobbying resources is 
viewed as a vital part of  her parliamentarian work in various committees. The relationship 
with lobbyists interests are described to be of  utmost importance since these alliance allows 
the political policy fields of  interest to progress (Interview 3: 2015). Mr Adaktusson described 
the relationship to lobbyists as a symbiosis. There is a constant need for external resources in 
a variety of  policy fields and the importance of  exchanging information and views are 
described as a vital part for the functioning of  the daily work (Interview  3: 2015). Mrs Lahdo 
confirms that the demand for lobbying input brings vital insights, expertise and information 
and that the relationship with lobbying stakeholders is very beneficial for the parties 
(Interview 5: 2015).  
!
It is possible to conclude that a there is a significant relation of  mutual exchange and 
resource dependency between the institutional actors and lobbying stakeholders (Interview 2, 
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3, 4, 5, 6: 2015). It has also become evident that the organizational structure of  the 
Commission and the Parliament plays a part in explaining their interdependence to lobbyism. 
The Commission is a relatively small institution which in relation to its areas of  competence 
are understaffed and do not have all the in-house competences needed to be able to cover 
legislation in all the EU areas of  competence. This implies that the Commission’s division of  
policy sector oriented departments desire specific knowledge and know-how techniques for 
each policy field, which is virtually impossible to obtain in-house due to the very detailed 
areas of  knowledge expected to be covered as well as the fact that the Commission is 
understaffed in relation to its work load. These features indicate that the current 
organizational structure is built in such a way that makes the Commission dependent on 
lobbying input in order to carry out what is intended. The Parliaments organizational 
structure play a role in their interdependence towards lobbying stakeholders as their 
engagement in various parliamentarian committees as well as their part in finalizing the 
Commission’s proposals and their agendas as politicians create a large and diverse scope of  
demand for input from lobbying stakeholders which can assist them in various aspects of  their 
duties. 
!
!
4.3 The linkage between the Dependent variable and the 
Independent variable 
!
Based on the interviewees' contributions concerning the Commission and the 
Parliament's various demands for input, it can be concluded that the degree of  
interdependence could explain why the level of  demands differ. The empirical material 
indicate that the level of  interdependence between the Commission and the Parliament to 
lobbying stakeholders are similar, however, the scope of  policy fields which needs to be 
covered are larger within the Parliament as they cover many policies depending on their 
political agendas the variety of  Committees, as oppose to the Commission which is 
specialized and require a large amount of  input regarding the specific field which in they 
work. It emerges clearly that Parliament has a great need of  lobbying resources as they are 
involved in a variety of  issues and policy areas simultaneously. Unlike the Commission, which 
is specialized in each area of  EU policies, the Parliament needs resources regarding a wide 
variety of  areas. The scope of  matters to be covered by the parliamentarians in the 
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committees they are members of, and the information required to be able to propose 
amendments to the Commission's legislative proposals are generally larger than those that the 
Commission demands. However, the actual frequency of  demands appears to be similar 
between the Commission and the Parliament. It is the scope of  fields of  demanded input 
which differs. All of  the interviewees which confirmed the indicators of  interdependence, i.e., 
mutual exchange, resource dependence and were the organizational structure makes 
institutional actors dependent on lobbying input, there where a high degree of  demanded 
input. In other words, the empirical material show that as the indicators for Interdependence 
have been met, it correlates with more frequent demands, which help explain why the 
demands are higher or lower as well as how their type of  demands can be discerned through 
their relations of  interdependence. The hypothesis aimed to test whether; The higher the 
degree of  interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials, the more 
institutional demands for lobbying input. The empirical analysis have shown that there is a 
linkage between the dependent and the independent variable and confirmed this thesis 
hypothesis. The degree of  interdependence has assisted in answering the questions of  how the 
demands can be discerned, and why they differ, by showing that the interviewees who met the 
indicators for interdependence, also frequently demanded input, meaning that the empirics 
showed a linkage between a relation of  interdependence and increasing demands for lobbying 
input.   
!
!
!
Indicators for 
Interdependence
Degree of Interdependence Type of Demands
!
Mutual exchange
The interviewees which stated that 
they have a frequent contact with 
lobbying stakeholders also stated 
that they —> 
Frequently demand lobbying input, 
meaning increased type of  
demands
!
Resource dependence
The interviewees which stated that 
they are in frequent need of  
resources which lobbyists possesses, 
also showed that —> 
Their scope of  demands are larger 
and stretches across various aspects 
of  their work 
!
Organizational structure
The interviewees which showed 
that the demanded lobbying input 
is important or vital for fulfilling 
working duties, also showed that  
—> 
Their type of  demands which are 
requested are vital for their 
functioning and for the efficiency 
of  developing EU policies 
(legislative or non-legislative)
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!5 Conclusion 
!
!
The contextual meaning of  the term lobbying is highly disputed and is often associated 
with both corruption as well as being a recognized supplier of  information. The 
comprehensive focus on how lobbyists are operating towards the EU institutions, motivated 
for conducting a study which focuses on the opposite, i.e., on what the Commission’s and the 
Parliament’s demands for lobbying input are. The research problem of  this thesis is based on 
the apparent discrepancy between the societal perception and the substantial functions of  
lobbying in relation to the EU institutions. In order to understand the phenomenon of  
lobbying, a thorough understanding of  what the interacting actors’ roles are is needed. This 
thesis has aimed to fill out parts of  the theoretical gap regarding how the demand side of  
lobbying can look, by asking the questions “What are the European Commission’s and the 
European Parliament’s different demands for lobbying input? How can it be discerned, and 
why does it differ?” The research question has been answered by comparing the Commission 
and the Parliament demands for lobbying input through six interviews and text materials on 
the basis of  the theoretical framework. It has highlighted various institutional demands for 
lobbying input and tested whether the degree of  interdependence impact the scope of  input 
that is requested. Within the theoretical framework, Bouwen has established a scheme of  
supply and demand in regard to the EU legislative process, in order to investigate various 
lobbyists’ access to the policy process. This thesis desired to develop Bouwen's variables of  
institutional demands and decided that the established institutional demands would function 
as the thesis dependent variable. In order to explain the dependent variable, this thesis added 
an independent variable, i.e., interdependence, which has proven useful to explain the how 
the dependent variable can be discerned and why it differs. 
!
As demonstrated in the analysis, one can see a difference in demands for lobbying input 
between the Commission and the Parliament. The Commission and the Parliament are 
devoted to different constituencies, which makes their objectives over political considerations 
diverse. This affect their demands for lobbying input vastly. As the Commission is concerned 
with the encompassing European interests, and is divided into policy oriented departments, 
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the demands are specific for each office, DG and Cabinet since it requires specific input on 
particular policy fields that they work with. The interview with Mr Ceballos Barón from the 
Trade Cabinet, showed that there is a constant demand for lobbying input in order to know 
how current international trade obstacles affect European interests and in order to remove 
trade and investment barriers for European stakeholders and facilitate beneficial trade. The 
need for input is very specific for trade and investment related matters and serves to benefit all 
European stakeholders affected in this field. According to the interviewees from the Trade 
Cabinet, the demands for lobbying input is not for legislative purposes, which is an addition to 
the dependent variable were all the types of  demands were directly connected to the 
legislative procedure. In line with this are the MEPs demands for lobbying input, which is 
multifaceted and not purely connected to the legislative process, but rather to their positions 
as substitute in various committees.  
!
The interviewees from the Parliament have shown that their demands for lobbying input 
is more diverse in comparison to the demands of  the Commission. The MEPs demands range 
across a variety of  policy fields depending on which national party they represent, which 
Committees they are a member of  and what their personal interests as politicians are. It is of  
utmost importance that the MEPs are actively involved in issues that their constituency expect 
them to be involved in, in order to increase their chances for being re-elected.  
!
Five out of  six interviewees who met the indicators for interdependence seem to have a 
similar relation to lobbyism. They all stated to frequently meet and interact with lobbyists in 
order to exchange or receive resources which is of  great importance for their work. However, 
the main difference lies in the use of  the input. The Parliament’s organizational structure 
makes their scope of  policy fields to cover larger than the employees in the Commission, 
which means that they use the received input for a wider amount of  working areas, while the 
Commission's input is used for the specific policy area in which they work. The hypothesis 
aimed to test whether the higher the degree of  interdependence between lobbyists and EU 
decision-makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. The analysis has 
shown that there is a linkage between the dependent and the independent variable and 
confirmed this thesis hypothesis.   
!
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A clear conclusion that can be demonstrated on the basis of  what the empirical material 
demonstrated, is that the term lobbying continues to be very diffuse and is understood in 
different ways. It remains a phenomenon that individuals, even within the same office, 
perceive and relate to very differentially. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the different 
demands for lobbying input is at a personal level and needs to be thoroughly mapped in 
various areas in order to make a generalization in broader terms possible. 
!
With the analysis as a basis, the conclusions of  the various demands for lobbying input 
can be said to be significant and of  great importance in relation to the EU institutions' daily 
work and functionality. The ramification of  lobbying is better understood when viewed as an 
important part of  the information based system of  EU governance. It is a knowledge-bank 
which distributes policy-relevant information and expertise on any given matter among the 
EU institutions, securing institutional procedures for further development. This thesis has 
shown that there is a diversity of  institutional demands for lobbying input within the EU and 
that there is a sense of  interdependence between actors in the EU institutions and lobbyists. It 
has further offered an insight into what the Commission’s and the Parliament’s demands for 
lobbyists input can look like, how it can be depicted and why there is a difference between the 
respective institutions. 
!
Knowledge of  the different institutional needs and demands for lobbying input should 
be investigated further. The incomplete state of  knowledge in this research field encourages 
the continuation of  empirical studies on the EU's institutional demands for lobbying input. A 
more in-depth study of  institutional demands for lobbying input within the Commission’s 
different departments and an equivalent mapping of  an extensive amount of  MEPs demands 
for lobbyist input would provide a solid base for the two institutions demands. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!Appendix I: Interview Guide 
Questions 
!
1) How often are you in contact with lobbyists?  
- Never, Rarely, Often, Frequently, More than 3 times per week? !
2) What kind  of  lobbyist are you most in contact with and Why?  
- Professional associations, companies, law firms, public affairs consultancies, chambers of  
commerce, academic organizations, trade unions, NGO’s and associations of  NGO’s, 
representatives of  religions, churches and communities of  conviction, think-thanks and public 
authorities like regions cities and municipalities?  !
3) Do you need input from lobbyists? 
Yes; Why and When? 
No; Why not? !
4) How often do you need/demand input from lobbyists? 
- Never, Rarely, Often, Frequently, More than 3 times per week? !
5) What kind of  goods is it you ask for? (information needs, mapping positions on particular 
topics/policies, exchange of  services, information to support legislation etc?) !
6) Would you say that the Commission and the Parliament have different needs when it comes 
to lobbyist input? 
- What differences are there according to your experience?  
- Is the lobbyist input used/facilitated for different purposes? Examples?  !
7) Do you think lobbying input is important in relation to your work? 
- What is it that is important that you gain? 
What is lobbyists contributing, according to you? Examples? !
8) Would you say that there is an interdependency between politicians/officials and lobbyists? 
Yes; How and why? 
No; Why not? !
9) Do you have an example from a personal experience where external input in the form 
of…?…was required?
"  OF "70 70
